Americas Defense Meltdown - IT Acquisition Advisory Council

130 • Reversing the Decay of American Air PowerTable 1. Major U.S. Air Force Active and Reserve Component Aircraft in 2008 3U.S. Air ForceActive/ReserveAircraftFirst Year ofDevelopmentQuantityDirect CombatAircraftSupportAircraftA-10 1967 249 249 -OA-10 1967 108 - 108AC-130 1966 21 21 -B-1 1965 64 64 -B-2 1980 20 20 -B-52 1952 94 94 -C-5 1964 111 - 111C-17 1981 165 - 165C-130 1951 514 - 514F-15 1968 714 714 -F-16 1969 1,319 1,319 -F-22 1986 100 100 -E-3 1971 32 - 31KC-135 1955 532 - 532KC-10 1977 59 - 59Total 4,102 2,581 1,521Shortly after World War I, the U.S. Army Air Corps, 4 as well as the British RoyalAir Force (RAF) and the German Luftwaffe, became captivated by General Douhet’stheory of air power: strategic bombardment could win a war by itself by attackingthe enemy’s heartland.At the close of World War I, our Army Air Corps possessed approximately 12,000pursuit fighters. By 1930, it let this fleet became a worn out and dated force of 400obsolescent biplane pursuit aircraft – a mere 3 percent of its former greatness. Noother U.S. military arm was cut so severely. On the other hand, by 1941 the Army AirForce had developed an inconceivable 71 separate bombers. 5 Throughout this period,bomber funding dominated the air power budgets. Typically, while four to six fighterswould equal the cost of one bomber, the force ratios actually procured were heavilybiased in favor of bombers. 6 Because of the almost exclusive budgetary emphasison bombers by the U.S. Army Air Force, the Royal Air Force and the Luftwaffe, thethree great air superiority fighters of the World War II western combatants (the U.S.Army Air Force P-51 Mustang, the RAF Spitfire, and the Luftwaffe ME-109) were all