Americas Defense Meltdown - IT Acquisition Advisory Council

138 • Reversing the Decay of American Air Powerthe technological expertise to develop the complex V-2 but were unable to appreciatethe V-2’s minuscule effectiveness.Luftwaffe conclusionsIn the Battle of Britain, German bombers attacked British airfields but achieved littlewith heavy losses. Even less effective were the following fall’s night incendiary offensivesagainst London, Essex, Canterbury and other cities. Not only were Germanlosses high, but the British population became so outraged that war volunteers and warproduction soared. In contrast, the tiny force of 300 or so operational close-supportStukas achieved real successes in support of the Blitzkrieg armies slashing their wayinto France and Russia.German historian Cajus Bekker summarized the Allies’ successes and failuresagainst the Luftwaffe as follows:“From 1944 on, the possession of long range fighters [P-51 Mustangs] ...enabledthe Americans to win air control over Germany. ...British Bomber Command’sendeavor to decide the issue of the war by carpet bombing of the German citieswas unsuccessful. ...[German] war production ... reach[ed] its highest ever outputat the peak of the bombardment. ...Victory for the Allies was much more [due] tothe overwhelming superiority of their tactical forces during and after the invasion....In other words it was attacks on military targets, not those on the civilianpopulation. ...that decided the issue. That lesson should never be forgotten.” 34RAF Bomber CommandSir Arthur “Bomber” Harris was the commander of the RAF Bomber Command.He was a true believer in the Douhet bombardment theory. Professor WilliamsonMurray described his philosophy: “Harris possessed an unshakable belief that, withthe necessary resources, his command could win the war by itself. ...[He] became aconvert to an “area” [city busting] bombing strategy.” 35Bomber Command’s forces consisted of only between 400 to 500 bombers in 1942.The RAF’s attempted bomber buildup barely progressed because of continuing heavylosses, which totaled 1,404 four-engine heavy bombers for 1942. 36 To lose almostthree times the initial bomber force in a single year was horrendous. The bomberscaused great civilian damage to Ruhr cities but had little effect on German militaryproduction, which accelerated throughout the year.To fight the “Battle of Berlin” between August 1943 and March 1944, Harris wasconvinced that his bombers alone could kill enough civilians to cause the Germanstate to capitulate. The RAF Bomber Command lost its entire bomber fleet every threemonths. Losses for January 1943 to March 1944 came to 5,881 bombers. 37 To havelost almost 6,000 bombers with 30,000 associated aircrew casualties in 15 months