Americas Defense Meltdown - IT Acquisition Advisory Council

Col. Douglas Macgregor & Col. G.I. Wilson • 89just the Army or the Marines. Adding joint plugs and liaison officers to redundant andexpensive single-service division, corps and Army headquarters is not the answer. Itis nothing more than premium platinum layering.Joint C2 must focus on integrated force design and a universal command web.The operational driver is the streamlining and integration of systems, service headquarters,and operational elements, NOT the proliferation of them. It is difficult, ifnot impossible at times to share information and intelligence due to single-serviceinterface issues, politics, and physics. Our single-service mindset often witnessesthe hoarding of intelligence and information rather than it being put to use. So toothe cloak-and-dagger aspects of classification across the services overtake the fundamentalsmeans of exploiting information and intelligence. This unwittingly preemptsintegrated maneuver.The organizing imperative must be the integration of maneuver and strike assetsthrough a flatter operational architecture empowered by new terrestrial and spacebasedcommunications. With the right collaborative tools and systems architecture,there is no reason why a joint force command (JFC) cannot effectively command ajoint expeditionary force of soldiers and marines plus routine operational control ofavailable air and naval strike assets. Ideally, a JFC should be a lean entity along thelines envisioned by Lesley McNair for World War II corps headquarters, and it shouldbe prepared to take on whatever combat power is assigned.The mission to implement this operational concept inside the JFC falls to thelieutenant general or vice admiral in the JFC. (Figure 4 on the next page.) With theexpansion of American strike, intelligence and information assets, the JFC commandermust be supported by deputy commanders and staffs that can employ the full complimentof air, ground, electronic information and logistical capabilities.The deputy commander for maneuver inside the JFC directs the operations of theground maneuver. As a major general, he brings an appreciation of the critical role thatpositional advantage plays in the calculus of warfare to the planning and executionof operations. Since attacks against U.S. forces will blur the distinction between seaand land combat, particularly in future battles for control of coastal regions, his rolein the decision to commit ground forces is enormously important.The IISR deputy commander will build, maintain and disseminate the commonoperating picture. This mission decrees that his responsibilities might range fromlaunching battlefield satellites to tasking UAVs and Special Operations forces for reconnaissancemissions. Thus, the integration of intelligence and information operationswith reconnaissance and surveillance efforts under one deputy commander in the JFCis vital to the maintenance of a coherent operational picture of the battlespace.Another major general or vice admiral (lower half) must command strike operations.His mission is to de-conflict and harmonize strike and maneuver operations inany fight, thus preventing fratricide. To date, the Army has resisted the creation of a