Americas Defense Meltdown - IT Acquisition Advisory Council

212 • Long in Coming, the Acquisition Train Wreck is HereThe Front-End of the Process Sows the Seeds of Future ProblemsThese programs also epitomize what astute observers have found to be a fundamentaldeficiency in the overall defense acquisition process – the front-end of the process.They have pinpointed the development and setting of requirements, both technicaland operational, as sowing the seeds for these future problems. Among the proposedremedies in this area has been the repeated call for attainable, affordable and testablerequirements based on realistic budget toplines and threat projections and performance/costtradeoffs that, in turn, rely on the projection of realistic system lifecyclecosts and force levels.Unfortunately, the process has whetted, if not heartily reinforced, the appetite ofthe users for quantum leaps in capability that are reflected in high-risk, sometimesunattainable, technical and operational requirements. Many of these “reach for themoon” system performance goals have resulted from the salesmanship of the DODresearch and development communities, combined with industry lobbying, in successfullyconvincing the user that advanced capabilities could be delivered rapidlyand cheaply. Over the years, this process has been warped by the ever-optimisticprojections of available funding both in the near-term as well as into the out-years, inessence relieving the decision-maker of any need to make the hard choices.Part and parcel of this effort to sell a new program – to get the camel’s nose underthe tent, so to speak – is the so-called “buy-in” syndrome, whereby costs, schedule andtechnical risks are often grossly understated at the outset. These low-ball estimatesmesh right in with the optimistic overall budget top line projections into the out-years,especially the procurement accounts. As illustrated earlier in this chapter, in case aftercase, Pentagon decision-makers have acquiesced to programs entering FSED/SDD andeven low-rate initial production before technical problems are identified, much lesssolved; before credible independent cost assessments are accomplished and includedin program budget projections; and even before the more risky requirements aredemonstrated in testing. The overwhelming abundance of such data clearly points toa problem with the DOD acquisition system itself that cannot be written off to poormanagement of individual programs, although this does occur sometimes as well.This root of the problem is well known: The aforementioned process reviews haverepeatedly found that we should “fly and know if it works and how much it will costbefore buying.” Building and testing competitive prototype systems and subsystemsbefore proceeding with FSED/SDD has been a recommendation of several of thesestudies and, as discussed earlier, directed by Young. In that same vein, these reviewshave called for up-front funding of robust efforts to demonstrate technology maturityas a prerequisite for program approval. DOD’s acquisition policy and directives haveincorporated these recommendations. Unfortunately, the rising operating and support(O&S) costs of the existing forces, and the fact that there are more acquisitionprograms being pursued than DOD can possibly afford in the long term, have com-