Americas Defense Meltdown - IT Acquisition Advisory Council

88 • Maneuver Forces: The Army and Marine Corps After Iraq25,000 would come from a pool of 125,000 troops consisting of supporting groupsorganized for sustainment, IISR or strike operations depending on the mission.Of course, committing a 60,000 man expeditionary force to a regional unifiedcommand within 30 to 45 days from the moment the national command authoritiesdetermine to use it requires the nation to provide the sealift and the airlift to moveit. But knowing the size and capabilities of the ground maneuver force does providea concrete target for the construction of ships and aircraft to do the job, somethingthat is missing from current defense planning.Surging additional forces to a regional unified command from the pool of Armyand Marine forces in the rotational readiness system could commence as soon as theair and naval assets to move them were available. Within 90 days, an expeditionarymaneuver force of 120,000 soldiers and Marines could be deployed and ready to fightin any of the regional unified commands. If required, the expeditionary force couldbe relieved in another six months by a similar force of 120,000. Or a second force of120,000 could be deployed to yet another theater if conditions warranted it.The 298,000 soldiers and Marines not assigned to the pool of 377,000 soldiersand Marines inside maneuver forces on rotational readiness would be available toman the training, administrative and support structures in the United States andthe regional unified commands. The Army National Guard and Reserve could alsobe reorganized to mirror this organizational paradigm in rotational windows thatmake sense for citizen soldiers and ensure their readiness to conduct expeditionaryor homeland defense operations if needed.Building Joint C2 while trimming unneeded overheadThe idea that a Marine flag officer or an Army general could command the forces ofthe other service is anathema. Both services seem to have forgotten that in WorldWar I when Gen. John J. Pershing had to replace the Army major general who commandedthe Army’s 2nd Infantry Division, a division that also contained two brigadesof Marine infantry, he selected Marine Corps Brig. Gen. John Archer LeJeune for thecommand. LeJeune commanded the division with distinction and went on to becomethe Marine Corps commandant after the war. Returning to this kind of jointness demandsan integrated joint C2 structure that compels officers from different servicesto cross service lines to be effective. Fortunately, the standard for a joint force-capableheadquarters is well known.A joint force headquarters must have the capability to command and controlintegrated joint operations to accomplish missions in a defined joint operations area.This capability demands the ability to employ assigned and attached forces, includingmultinational forces, as well as coordinating and integrating intergovernmental andnongovernmental organizations and multinational partners’ support.For joint C2 to be meaningful, flag officers must be drawn from all services, not