Americas Defense Meltdown - IT Acquisition Advisory Council

Col. Douglas Macgregor & Col. G.I. Wilson • 93• When it comes to rapid prototyping, always go for the most “bang for the buck.”Buy the maximum amount of capability affordable at the time. The newest andgreatest systems today will be outdated and bordering on obsolescence by thetime the procurement process ends and fielding begins. Set the bar as high aspossible, but stick with the concept of a “good enough capability” based on thebest available technology.• Given the pace of technological change, today’s “gold-plated wonder weapons”are tomorrow’s commercial off-the-shelf products. Invest in promising prototypes,but in small quantities before billions are invested, under conditionswhere the new technology can find its way into unintended uses, keeping inmind that technologies do not arrive without a price in cost, schedule andcomplexity – or that there are easy, quick fixes.Opposition to rapid prototyping, however, remains strong. It stems from theestablished bureaucratic practice of controlling programs to reduce risk by organizingdevelopment around time-driven phases separated in time by approval pointsor milestones. In truth, this approach is a prescription for obsolescence years laterwhen and if the promised gold-plated system arrives. And it is the antithesis of howbusinesses are run.Applying business practices to the defense acquisition system means that accountabilitymust be assigned to uniformed and civilian leaders involved in acquisition forthe maintenance of cost, schedule and delivery of a product that meets warfighterneeds. The business world examines the efficient use of resources to sustain and growmarket shares. The Department of Defense, including the Army and the Marine Corpsmust do the same. 34ConclusionsArmed Forces are more than military organizations. They are spiritual bodies vulnerableto the myth-making power of popular military history and the media. But mythsdo not trump the powerful technological, social and economic forces that shape historyand these forces do not allow the nation’s armies, navies and air forces to existin a vacuum. 35 Either Americans adapt the old structures to new strategic conditionsor we risk catastrophic defeat at the hands of a more agile opponent in the yearsahead. It’s also important to remember that as adaptation occurs, it is easier for theAmerican military establishment to step down to fight a weak opponent than it is tostep up and fight a strong one.Change in leadership, structure and thinking will not be easy in the Army or theMarines. America’s bureaucrats in uniform convey the impression of tolerating thecivilian service secretaries who hold statutory legal authority over the services, but