Americas Defense Meltdown - IT Acquisition Advisory Council

72 • Leading the Human Dimensions Out of a Legacy of Failureinvolves far more than the medical and law professions, but includes all positions thatrequire graduate-level, civilian-related education or technical training such as acquisitioncorps, academic instructors, operations research system analysis, comptrollers,computer programmers, communications specialists and facilities managers.Officers in this category could remain captains, with pro-rated pay, but wouldhave to continually demonstrate their proficiency with periodic examinations combinedwith reviews of their evaluation reports. Officers could opt for promotion asthe technical experts at division or higher levels, while the appropriate higher-levelranks would correspond with higher headquarters and responsibilities.Training and Education SystemThe education system as touched upon earlier will dramatically change as well. A trueeducation is much more than the learning of skills or the acquisition of facts. Rather,it means acquiring a broad understanding of the art of war, its ideas, principles andhistory. This true education must also give a thorough grounding in the warrior/leaderculture, with heavy emphasis on making decisions and welcoming responsibility.To conduct maneuver warfare, which is needed to facilitate the reductions in forcestructure and manpower cited above, a shift is needed from mere mental “training” totruly educating Army leaders. A shift is also needed away from the current practice ofgiving all branches, regardless of their relationship to the battlefield, “equity” in attendingILE or sending favored officers so “they can make contacts.” A maneuver warfareArmy demands leaders with a particular mindset, a culture that rewards audacity,tempo and creative decision-making. As a people, Americans possess the requisiteskills to be successful in maneuver warfare, but our military professionals also requirea military education that will encourage and develop boldness and mental agility.Instead of forming the repositories for innovative, thorough training and education,most intermediate service schools remain Cartesian in their methods – mired inmemorization and adherence to formulas; advancing immutable formats, principlesor processes that, if properly learned and applied, will supposedly bring victory.Schools emphasizing such rules, reinforced with the properly formatted quantitativedecision-aids and tables, serve only to numb creativity in leadership.Making military education relevant to future war, with its myriad of changes andchallenges, will not be easy. Already, the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan demand thatleaders understand the political and strategic implications of their actions, particularlyin light of the impact of new, real-time media. With rules of engagement (ROE) thatimpose limitations on their operational and tactical capabilities, the officers of thenext century face unique challenges.Because the officer corps will be relatively small and there will be fewer in theoperational track, ILE should come soon after the officer is selected for the operationaltrack. War college should also come sooner, perhaps as early as after 10 to 12 years of