Americas Defense Meltdown - IT Acquisition Advisory Council

96 • Maneuver Forces: The Army and Marine Corps After Iraq22 Michael Deane, Ilana Kass, and Andrew Porth, “The Soviet Command Structure in Transformation,”Strategic Review (Spring 1984): 64–65. Notice, however, that fronts (equivalent in size toAmerican armies) were also fully joint commands. When the Soviet Union’s 40th Army deployedto Afghanistan in 1979, it did so as part of a JTF structure that was fully joint. On the otherhand, jointness stopped at the JTF level, which caused serious problems below.23 Dependence on other programs like JTRS and TSAT presents additional problems. TSAT iscrucial to FCS secure networking capabilities. If TSAT collapses, which looks like a distinctpossibility, soldiers may have to rely on links that are harder to access on the move, more vulnerableto jamming and interceptions, and offer nowhere near as much bandwidth. See AlecKlein, “Weapons Upgrade Faces Big Hurdles: Problems With Wireless Technology May ThreatenArmy’s Ambitious Plan,” The Washington Post, April 8, 2008.24 Kris Osborn, “Battle Command’ Summits. U.S. Army Brings Experts Together For IT Roadmap,”DefenseNews.com, February 4, 2008.25 Marina Malenic and Daniel Wasserbly, “Abercrombie skeptical of acceleration talk. FCS fundshang in balance as lawmakers focus on current readiness,” Inside the Army, February 25,2008.26 Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Future Corps. The Marine Corps, like the Army, has worn out a lot ofequipment in Afghanistan and Iraq, and is facing big bills to pay for the future force it says itneeds.” National Journal, May 10, 2008.27 Ellen Knickmeyer, “Demise Of A Hard-Fighting Squad. Marines Who Survived Ambush AreKilled, Wounded in Blast,” The Washington Post, May 12, 2005.28 Bryan Bender, “Marine Units Found To Lack Equipment, Corps estimates of needs in Iraq arecalled faulty,” The Boston Globe, June 21, 2005.29 Given the dramatic changes in the technology of warfare since World War II, any contemporaryAmerican military attempt today to reenact Operation Cobra, the breakout from Normandy, orOperation Iceberg, the invasion of Okinawa, with an opponent that has access to a fraction ofthe modern technology that is available now would court disaster. Large concentrations of U.S.ground forces whether on land or at sea invite enemy attack with weapons of mass destruction(WMD) before the fighting even begins.30 “Last Chance For The EFV,” Strategy Page, June 11, 2008. EFV weighs nearly 36 tons, is 10.5feet tall, 12 feet wide and just under 30 feet long. It's armed with one 30-mm automatic cannon(MK34 Bushmaster) and one 7.62-mm co-axial machine gun.31 Alex Berenson, “Fighting the Old-Fashioned Way in Najaf,” The New York Times, August 29, 2004.32 Associated Press, “Study Faults Bureaucrats For Deaths Of Marines. Missteps slowed deliveryof blast-resistant vehicles,” The Arizona Republic, February 16, 2008.33 Michael Moss, “Safer Vehicles for Soldiers: A Tale of Delays and Glitches,” The New York Times,June 26, 2005.34 Adm. William Owens, “The Business of Defense Does Matter” (to be published).35 Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism: Civilian and Military (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1959).36 Ibid.37 The Unified Command Plan (UCP), the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), and the Forcesfor Memorandum are outputs of this process. The UCP and JSCP are produced biennially. TheForces for Memorandum is produced annually. The process implements the Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) legal obligation for strategic planning. It is conducted by the jointstaffs of the CJCS and the unified commands.38 Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism: Civilian and Military (New York: The Free Press, 1959).