Americas Defense Meltdown - IT Acquisition Advisory Council

Thomas Christie • 211ceeding with the doomed full-up missile shots. When questioned by the independentreview panel as to how this had come to pass, the THAAD program manager statedthat he had no contractual means to pressure the prime contractor, Lockheed-Martin,to carry out the planned ground tests. It was this review of THAAD which coined amost appropriate phrase, “rush to failure,” to describe the sequence of events leadingto the test fiascos.Underestimating Technical Problems is a Major Cause of Program ProblemsOne need only examine the history of three of DOD’s largest and most controversialprograms undertaken in the past 20-plus years to further substantiate that launchinginto major developments without understanding key technical issues is the root causeof major cost and schedule problems. The Army’s Comanche armed reconnaissancehelicopter program began in 1981 as the LHX, planned at the time to replace theArmy’s fleet of UH-1 utility and AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters. After spending billionsof dollars over two decades and undertaking several restructures of the program, thelatter brought about by continuing technical problems and cost growth, the Army’sleadership canceled the program in 2003.The Department of Navy’s MV-22 program had a similar checkered history.Initiation of the joint Army/Marine Corps JVX program was approved in the fall of1981, followed by approval to enter the Demonstration/Validation phase in 1982.Later, a Milestone II review in 1986 approved the program’s entry into FSED/SDD.Designed as a much-needed replacement for the Marine Corps aging CH-46 mediumlifthelicopter fleet, the MV-22 finally completed its second Operational Evaluation(OPEVAL) in 2005, a prerequisite for the full-rate production decision that followedlater that year. In the meantime, the Marine Corps had procured over 50 MV-22s inLow-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) over the previous six or more years, running therisk of needing additional funding for these aircraft to incorporate fixes to problemsuncovered in testing after their procurement. In any event, close to 25 years andabout $15 billion later, the Marine Corps finally reached the point of replacing its1960s vintage CH-46s.In a similar vein, the early 1980s witnessed a debate about the scope and requirementsfor the Air Force’s Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) program which eventuallybecame the F-22. As discussed earlier, with respect to Air Force fighter/attack aircraftmodernization, the F-22 encountered unforeseen technical problems during its FSED/SDD. Operational testing was delayed several years while unexpected problems withcomplex software and avionics reliability were discovered during development testingand time-consuming fixes were designed and implemented. In the end, theseproblems along with large cost increases resulted in a procurement program of aboutone quarter the number of aircraft originally planned.