Americas Defense Meltdown - IT Acquisition Advisory Council

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206 • Long in Coming, the Acquisition Train Wreck is Hereous technical problems, the F-22 finally completed its Initial Operational Test andEvaluation (IOT&E) in 2004, several years later than planned, and obtained approvalfor full-rate production in early 2005. Nearly 20 years and close to $40 billion afterits beginning, the F-22 achieved an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in December2005. By that time, cost and schedule problems had led to the Pentagon’s decision tolimit the production run to some 180 aircraft and close the line following procurementof the last F-22s in FY 2009. The total acquisition costs for this drastically reducedbuy is now projected at $64.5 billion, slightly more than projected nine years ago fornearly twice the number of F-22s.But the F-22 Wasn’t the Only CulpritTo exacerbate the Air Force’s dire predicament even further are other large modernizationprograms that will demand an increasing share of its potentially lower investmentaccounts in the coming years. Among the big programs are: the Next GenerationTanker Aircraft; the Space-Based Infra-Red System-High (SBIRS-H), the NationalPolar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS), the GPS-III,the Air Borne Laser, the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM), and the GlobalHawk High Altitude Endurance (HAE) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). Several ofthese programs are plagued with significant cost growth, performance problems andschedule delays that will put increasing pressure on Air Force modernization plansinto the next decade.The previously referenced GAO report, entitled “Defense Acquisitions, Assessmentsof Selected Weapons Programs,” and dated March 2008, provides a wealth ofinformation on the status of these programs among a total of some 95 DOD acquisitionprograms evaluated in the report. It is the primary source of the following discussionof cost and schedule problems facing Air Force acquisition officials as they cope withthe dilemma of funding these programs in the coming years at the same time thatthey strive to modernize their tactical air forces.The SBIRS-H satellite system is being developed to replace the aging Defense SupportProgram (DSP) in meeting requirements for missile launch warning, technicalintelligence and battlespace awareness missions, critical to the success of plannedmissile defense systems. SBIRS-H plans call for a constellation of four satellites ingeosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO), two sensors on host satellites in highly ellipticalorbit (HEO), and fixed as well as mobile ground stations. Projected SBIRS-H RDT&Ecosts have more than doubled, from $4.4 billion to $8.5 billion, while total programcost grew by 140 percent to $10.5 billion in constant FY 2008 dollars in the decadesince development started in FY 1997.The Air Force has restructured the program more than once since its outset due totechnical, cost and schedule problems that resulted in Nunn-McCurdy breaches. TheNunn-McCurdy amendment to the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1982
Thomas Christie • 207was an attempt to limit cost growth in defense programs. It called for the terminationof weapons programs whose total costs had grown by more than 25 percent aboveoriginal estimates, unless they were certified as critical systems by the secretary ofdefense or if the cost growth was attributable to certain specified changes in the program.After delays of nearly two years, two HEO sensors have been delivered and,according to program officials, the first sensor’s on-orbit performance is “exceedingexpectations.” The first GEO satellite launch has been delayed to at least late 2009/early 2010, a schedule slip of a year. Design problems have recently emerged makingfurther schedule slippage of the GEO launches likely. For example, testing hasuncovered deficiencies in the flight software that controls the health and status of thespace vehicle. Both hardware and software changes may be necessary to correct theproblem and could cause a further delay of at least a year and up to a billion dollarsin additional funding.In a similar vein, several other Air Force space programs are troubled with growingcosts and schedule delays. For example, in the five years following a productiondecision in August 2002, NPOESS RDT&E costs increased from $5 billion to almost$8 billion, total program funding requirements grew to $10.7 billion from $6.3 billion,and the schedule slipped almost a year and a half. These cost problems resultedin a Nunn-McCurdy breach and subsequent Air Force restructure of the programfinalized in June 2007.The Global Hawk program is yet another system beset with significant cost, scheduleand performance problems. Global Hawk is a high altitude, long-endurance unmannedaircraft with integrated sensors and ground stations providing intelligence, surveillanceand reconnaissance capabilities. It entered development and limited production inMarch 2001. Soon after its start, the Air Force restructured the program from a lowrisk,incremental approach to a high-risk, highly concurrent strategy. Specifically, therestructuring aimed to develop and acquire the larger RQ-4B aircraft with more advancedbut immature technologies on an accelerated production schedule. Significant costincreases between 2002 and 2005 culminated in a Nunn-McCurdy unit-cost breach,which led to certification to Congress. The program has been re-baselined three times,and aircraft unit costs have more than doubled from $81 million to $178 million inFY 2008 dollars since program start. After several restructures and re-baselinings, thecurrent program plan procures seven aircraft similar to the original demonstrators (theRQ-4A) and 47 of a larger and more capable model (the RQ-4B).However, the program continues to encounter cost, performance and scheduleproblems. The RQ-4B aircraft had its first flight in March 2007, more than a year behindschedule. The first flight had been delayed, in part, due to problems identified duringtesting. Differences between the two models turned out to be much more extensiveand complex than anticipated, resulting in extended development times, frequentengineering changes and significant cost increases. The schedules for integrating,
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AMERICA’SDEFENSE MELTDOWN★ ★
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America’sDefenseMeltdownpentagon
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Bruce I. Gudmundsson served in the
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James P. Stevenson is the former ed
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table of contentsPrefaceExecutive S
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PrefaceThe mere notion of a “melt
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Preface• xieffective national sec
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executive summaryChapter Summaries
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Executive Summary • xvThe militar
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Executive Summary• xviiRecommenda
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Executive Summary• xixobjectives
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Executive Summary • xxiThe chapte
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Executive Summary• xxiii• Analy
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2 • Introduction & Historic Overv
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10 • Introduction & Historic Over
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CHAPTER 2SHATTERING ILLUSIONSA Nati
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28 • Shattering Illusions: A Nati
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54 • Leading the Human Dimensions
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CHAPTER 4MANEUVER FORCESThe Army an
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82 • Maneuver Forces: The Army an
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98 • A Traveler’s Perspective o
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100 • A Traveler’s Perspective
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CHAPTER 6the navyWilliam S. LindTo
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120 • The Navy- signaling - would
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122 • The NavyAt the same time, t
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124 • The Navyforce: first, to de
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126 • The Navywarfare usually wor
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128 • The NavyEndnotes1 Andrew Go
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130 • Reversing the Decay of Amer
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Americas Defense Meltdown - IT Acquisition Advisory Council

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