Americas Defense Meltdown - IT Acquisition Advisory Council

136 • Reversing the Decay of American Air Powerrates were about 500 percent greater. By every measure, the Stuka had a significantlysmaller loss rate than the bomber. Nonetheless, the Luftwaffe air staff continued themyth of Stuka vulnerability and left the aircraft production priorities unchanged.On September 21-24, 1941, several Stuka missions were sent against the SovietBaltic fleet operating in the Finnish Sea near Leningrad. Lt. Hans Rudel, of Stuka Pilotfame, damaged the Soviet battleship Marat on his first sortie. In an ensuing missionRudel sank a cruiser. A few days later, he dropped a delayed fuse 2,000 pound bombthat detonated an ammunition magazine in the Marat. It broke in half and sank whilein port. 27 The cost of all 4,900 Stukas produced over a 10-year period was about $25million – approximately the same cost as the battleship. The entire 10-year Stukaproduction run was justified on a single sortie. Other Stukas hit the Marat’s sisterbattleship, the Oktobrescaig Revolutia 10 times, inflicting great damage; they also sankseven other ships and damaged eight. 28Contrast that performance to the RAF bomber performance over a one-yearperiod on nearly identical missions. Two German battlecruisers, the Gneisenau andScharnhorst, plus a cruiser, Prinz Eugen, had been forced into Brest harbor just a shortdistance across the Channel from England. Over the next year, the British sent 299heavy bomber attack missions against the German ships – approximately 8,000 sorties.They lost 43 aircraft, all bombers and 247 airmen. 29 On Feb. 11, 1942, a year after theships had entered the port, they made a successful dash through the English Channelto Norway. The British sent continuous waves of multi-engine bombers to stop theirescape. They lost another 60 aircraft, again mostly bombers, and an estimated 345airmen. The Luftwaffe employed 150 ME-109s to provide cover over the escapingships. They lost 17 fighters and only 11 airmen. 30Both the Luftwaffe and the RAF had complete reports on the Stuka and RAFbombers’ results against battleships. Neither altered their advocacy of multi-enginebombers over single engine dive-bombing.Despite its successes in other missions, the primary utility of the Stuka was itstimely and effective close support of the German army. It was a key component ofthe blitzkrieg operations that were brilliantly successful in the German conquestof Poland, Denmark, Holland, Belgium and France. In the first year of the Russiancampaign, Stuka close support was devastating even though only about 300 Stukaswere operating across a 2,200-mile front. No total of Russian tanks destroyed bythose 300 Stukas is available but they must have accounted for many thousands.Rudel alone had confirmed kills of 518 tanks; the next highest Stuka pilot had approximately300 tank kills. 31In 1943, the Luftwaffe bomber generals canceled Stuka production. The last Stukawas produced in July 1944. 32 To replace it, the Germans had already developed theHs-129B, a well conceived follow-on. It had two widely spaced engines, an armoredcockpit and, most importantly, a 30-mm internal cannon that carried enough rounds