Americas Defense Meltdown - IT Acquisition Advisory Council

152 • Reversing the Decay of American Air Powerthree other IR missile strikes – two of them were repaired and quickly put back in thebattle. The third was not economical to repair. The A-10s also survived multiple antiaircraftartillery (AAA) hits, were repaired, and promptly sent back to the air battle.Because the “Fighter Mafia” imposed survivability requirements of unprecedentedstringency on the initial A-10 design, analysts projected that it would survive mostcombat hits at least long enough to bring the pilot back to friendly territory. In Gulfwar combat, 83 percent of A-10s that were hit made it to a safe landing, even betterthan the early projections. Moreover, of all combat aircraft in the war, the A-10 hadthe highest sortie rate as well as the highest in-commission rate, 95.7 percent.Lt. Gen. Charles Horner, the air commander in the first Gulf war, said, “I take backall the bad things I’ve said about the A-10s. I love them. They’re saving our asses.” 79Waging the post-Gulf War peace: changing the tune, punishing the victorsWith the war over, the U.S. Air Force strategic bombardment paradigm and the needto defend bomber budgets returned to the fore. The Air Force revived the 20-year-oldcanard used by the generals opposing the A-10 citing that the A-10 is vulnerable to hitsbecause its speed is limited. That despite the extraordinary daytime survivability theA-10 had just demonstrated in combat, not to mention its actual tactical target kills,far higher than any other fighter or bomber in the war. The post-war official Air Forceview was that the F-16s, F-15s, F-117s, B-1s, B-2s and B-52s “will posses the capabilityto conduct close air support and will be able to do so in the most demanding threatenvironment which the A-10 cannot survive.” 80 “One reason we’re keeping the A-10 isfor the niche environments – very, very low-threat environments where you’re doingcounter-insurgency operations.” 81 That is Lt. Gen. David Deptula speaking. At the time,he was in charge of planning for the Air Force’s highest combat aircraft headquarters,the Air Combat Command. Every phrase contradicts the empirical combat data.By the end of the first Gulf war, the Air Force had almost achieved its strategicbombardment dream. Its entire warfighting force was already strategic bombers orpseudo-strategic bombers. The exceptions were the A-10 and the F-15A/C. Accordingly,a major unfilled need for more complete fighter drawdown was to purify theforce by sending all the A-10s to the bone yard. Outside pressures and saner headsprevailed, partially: “only” half the A-10s were sent to the bone yard. In the meantime,the Air Force leadership was preoccupied with finding procurement funding to coverstill-continuing cost overruns for the B-1B and B-2 bomber programs while crankingup the hyperinflating F-22 program, the world’s first fighter to top one third ofa billion dollars.Kosovo Air warLed by the United States, eight NATO nations’ air forces planned a quick, two-daystrike against Yugoslavia in order to bomb the Milosevic government into submission,