Americas Defense Meltdown - IT Acquisition Advisory Council

134 • Reversing the Decay of American Air PowerPhase I of the battle began on July 1, 1940. The Luftwaffe was tasked to closethe English Channel to shipping and to clear British destroyer flotillas from theiranti-invasion bases. Rather rapidly, the Stukas sank one out of every three Britishships using the Channel. Within a few weeks, on July 27, the British gave up usingthe Channel. Ship losses were too great. 18 It was the Stuka’s victory, but once again,the Luftwaffe bombers acquired the lion’s share of this success through tailored airstaff reporting. 19In Phase II of the battle, the Luftwaffe planners predicted their strategic bomberswould achieve air superiority in four days of bombing the RAF fighter bases.The bombers failed. They did not achieve air superiority in four days, nor in fourmonths. 20 During the three months of July through September 1940, the Luftwaffelost 621 bombers (45 percent of initial strength) and 88 Stukas (21 percent of initialstrength). 21 The Stukas were pulled from the air battle three weeks before the endof September but shortly returned again in October. Correcting for the three weekhiatus would result in an estimated 29 percent Stuka loss compared to a 45-percentbomber loss rate. As a percent of initial strength, the bombers’ losses were 150 percentgreater than the Stukas’. However, the Stukas generally flew sorties each day at aboutthree times the bomber rate. Thus, on a per sortie basis, the bomber loss rates werefive times the rate of the Stukas.Fortunately for the Allies, the Luftwaffe ignored its own data. Bomber productionnumbers remained five times that of the Stuka and about 25 times that of the Stukain funding. The Luftwaffe had a winner in their inexpensive Stukas but put almost alltheir air-to-ground funding into the expensive but ineffective multi-engine bomber.As a direct result of the Luftwaffe’s crushing bomber daytime losses, the Germansswitched to night attack in October 1940. As is well known, this effort failed in itsobjectives to reduce British production and to lower civilian morale. In fact, “directattacks on British industrial targets and population centers only spurred British desiresto repay in kind.” 22 Worker morale and British war production increased rapidly.The strategic objective of Goering’s Battle of Britain bombing campaign was defeated.Operation Sea Lion, the German cross-Channel invasion, had to be put on indefinitehold. Despite huge bomber losses and lack of military gain, neither the Luftwaffe – northe RAF – altered their unbalanced, massive commitment to bomber production.Gen. Adolf Galland, commander of German day fighters succinctly summarizedhow the resources wasted on bombers harmed the German war effort:“In the beginning of 1940 the monthly production figure for the ME-109 wasapproximately 125 ... the peak was reached with a monthly production of2,500...in autumn 1944. [During and after a year and a half of massive bombardmentof German manufacturing plants.] At the end of 1944, we had afighter production about 20 times larger than it had been when the Luftwaffe