BEYOND SYRIA IRAQ

BEYOND IRAQ AND SYRIA
Executive Summary
IN EARLY JUNE 2016,the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL had built considerable
momentum in the fight against the IS “core” in Syria and Iraq.
Since its height in 2014, IS had lost almost half the territory it had previously
controlled in Iraq and 20 percent of its holdings in Syria. During the
week of June 9, coalition military forces began isolating Mosul by advancing
into nearby villages. In Syria, fighting reached the Mari line, and a twoline
offensive—Sunni opposition and the Kurdish People’s Defense Units
(YPG)—began to encircle Manbij.
In addition to coalition advances in Iraq and Syria, early June 2016 saw
increased activity against some Islamic State provinces. In particular, great
concern had arisen about the ability of Islamic State Libya to replicate the
strengths of IS core, based on a steady stream of seasoned jihadists from Syria
and Iraq, access to substantial resources, and the presence of a large, ungoverned
space. As a result, IS Libya came under military pressure from forces
loyal to the Government of National Accord. Having lost Darnah in late
2015, it was attacked in its stronghold of Sirte by brigades made up primarily
of fighters from Misratah, who drove back IS militants and captured crucial
points along the city’s edge.
Provinces elsewhere were also under pressure. In Egypt, the military
continued its campaign against IS in Sinai. In the Lake Chad basin, Boko
Haram lost a considerable amount of the territory it controlled as a result of
operations by the Multinational Joint Task Force. Ideological rifts emerged
within the leadership of the IS provinces in Yemen and sandbagged statebuilding
efforts, and the Saudi and Algeria provinces existed only on paper
and as a terrorist threat.
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