BEYOND SYRIA IRAQ

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
countries, Adnani called on them to stay where they are and conduct attacks
there. Movement of IS members between provinces appears to be centrally
directed for operational support purposes. A network of fishing and small boats
described by Mohktar Awad, for example, connects northern Sinai to Sirte and
may be used to move Islamic State Sinai leaders to Libya, possibly to consult
with IS leadership there, as well as to move weapons and money to IS Sinai.
In addition to IS Libya’s role in facilitation and coordination with IS elements
in sub-Saharan and North Africa, IS could possibly exploit human
trafficking from Libya to smuggle IS operatives into Europe. It seems more
likely, however, that IS will continue to rely on European passport holders, at
least for facilitation of its European networks. Despite the uptick in attacks
in Europe, none appears to have ties to IS provinces, although provinces
have claimed attacks in Yemen and Saudi Arabia against Shiite interests and
Saudi security forces, including by terrorists against their own family members;
the sabotaging of the Russian Metrojet in the Sinai; and the January
2015 Corinthia Hotel attack in Tripoli, Libya, which resulted in the death of
five foreigners and five Libyans.
■ Staying Power of Affiliates
A caliphate on the decline has a harder time directing resources to its periphery.
Although there are limited signs that substantial funds, fighters, and other
material support are flowing from IS core to several provinces, some groups
were likely motivated to pledge allegiance to the Islamic State based on at least
the perception that IS wealth and experience would be shared, if not made
part of a formal quid pro quo. Therefore, some provinces may only retain
their affiliation as long as resources are made available to support them.
Sinai, for example, is likely in need of funding, and a number of other provinces,
such as Boko Haram, benefit from media production centered in the
core. Fighters who were recruited by provinces that presented themselves as
alternatives to groups such as al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Yemen (al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP) or the Taliban in the Khorasan region of Afghanistan
and Pakistan might revert to their original groups. When other alternatives
are presented, buyer’s remorse may take hold, as evidenced by the public
rift within IS Yemen and those leaving IS Libya to rejoin Ansar al-Sharia.
A renunciation of any of the eight declared provinces of its oath to the
core would likely have a significant impact on the IS brand and organizational
morale. In particular, the loss of its safe haven in Libya would be most
devastating, as Libya has been viewed as a potential fallback were IS to lose
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