BEYOND SYRIA IRAQ

DAVID POLLOCK
Ramadi, or Fallujah offer varying accounts of their previous lives under IS
and of their reasons for escaping. They are as likely to focus on the fear of
getting caught in the crossfire as on the brutality or deprivation of IS rule.
The prisons and mass graves IS leaves behind are grim mementos of the coercive
aspect of its control. Yet some people reportedly continue to come and
go from Mosul nearly every day, venturing out from IS territory and then,
more-or-less voluntarily, returning to it.
The lessons for other IS provinces appear to be as follows: the Islamic
State rules mainly by intimidation or acquiescence, not by active popular
support. But even if many residents are not active IS supporters, they are
unlikely to rise up in active opposition. And a crucial issue for these subjugated
populations is the classic “compared to what” question: is the plausible
local alternative to IS likely to be any better for them?
Solid anecdotal reporting from analogous but non-IS areas, especially African
al-Qaeda or similar jihadist-contested zones, tends to support this intimidation
interpretation. In February 2016, the author heard convincing testimony
to this effect from other participants in the Marrakech Security Forum
on “Countering Jihad in Africa.” Rahma Dualeh, the Somali Countering Violent
Extremism (CVE) coordinator for the European Union mission in Nairobi,
noted that even now in Mogadishu, where al-Shabab has been largely
pushed out, many residents obey its declared school or other holidays rather
than the official ones—just in case those jihadists return with a vengeance.
Similarly, the senior Chadian police commander asserted that nearly 100 percent
of all the cigarettes sold in the Sahel are smuggled—and that al-Qaeda in
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) or related groups control the smuggling routes.
Without another option, all the smokers in the region are almost literally
addicted to accepting at least some jihadist presence in their lives.
Fortunately, and very surprisingly, the picture is much brighter in many
neighboring areas that have not fallen under IS control. Here, substantial
survey data is available, especially from polls supervised by the author in September
2014 and September 2015, along with other polls conducted by Pew,
Gallup, Zogby, and several other polling organizations in the past two years.
Without exception, these polls show that in key Arab Sunni societies like
Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, or the United Arab Emirates,
a mere 5 percent or less voice any approval for IS. Significantly, this is as
true for the youth cohort as for its elders. Moreover, this tiny proportion of
popular sympathy for IS has actually decreased rather than increased during
the past two years.
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