BEYOND SYRIA IRAQ

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
grow out of preexisting groups—such as those in Libya—would presumably
be more likely to remain loyal to the Islamic State, even as resources
diminish and the group comes under pressure from state, nonstate,
or international actors. On the flipside, groups that only “rebranded”
themselves as Islamic State provinces may be quicker to revert to a focus
on their original—typically local—grievances, support mechanisms,
and targets.
Islamic State Libya is an outlier in that it was developed under the direction
of IS leadership in Syria and Iraq. Although it has drawn fighters from
the Tunisian group Ansar al-Sharia (AAS), which operated in eastern Libya
before IS’s appearance on the scene, AAS has not pledged an oath to Baghdadi.
In fact, some IS Libya fighters are reported to have returned to fight for
AAS after IS Libya lost its safe haven in Darnah. Aaron Zelin explained that
Tunisian jihadists have historically played a role in IS founder Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi’s networks in the Levant, and a number of them returned to Libya
in 2013 to establish a presence there. The experiences gained by these jihadists
during their time in the Levant are important and point to closer ties to
IS core than exist for other provinces.
Operational ties between the Egypt-based Sinai Province, or Wilayat
Sinai, and the core are less apparent. Despite many jihadist ideological
roots in Egypt, Zarqawi had few preestablished ties with Sinai, according to
Mohktar Awad. The Egyptian group Ansar Beit al-Maqdis (ABM)—which
previously was primarily focused on fighting Israel—offered its allegiance
to the Islamic State, possibly as early as the summer of 2014. This oath not
only brought new, more deadly capabilities; it resulted in a greater focus of
these attacks on the Egyptian military and possibly led to the bombing of
the Russian commercial airliner. 2 The Sinai Province does not control territory
outright but operates relatively unimpeded by the local population
because of its accommodation of local Bedouin tribal interests. That being
said, Aymenn al Tamimi explained that the group has tried to implement
limited hisbah (Islamic police) activity, such as burning narcotics.
Both IS and its predecessor, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), have effectively
exploited sectarian divisions to gain support. A number of Islamic State
provinces operate in areas with sizable Shiite populations, such as Yemen
and Saudi Arabia, but in other areas, such as Libya and Egypt, sectarianism
does not play a significant role for local IS affiliates. So while Islamic
State Yemen could potentially exploit the instability wrought by the
Yemeni civil war to make advances there, internal disputes have weakened
the organization. Likewise, the “Nejd Province” of the Islamic State has
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