BEYOND SYRIA IRAQ

AYMENN AL TAMIMI
was destroyed, however, in June 2015 by the Mujahedin Shura Council of
Darnah and Its Suburbs, which is linked to al-Qaeda; and since then, IS has
been unable to reclaim a foothold in the city.
Further out to the west, IS has been able to consolidate territory on the
Mediterranean coastline based around the city of Sirte, which, unlike Darnah,
is a true stronghold of IS, falling under its Wilayat Tarabulus (Tripoli
province), while the easternmost towns on that stretch of territory are defined
as part of Cyrenaica province. In part, the dominance of IS in the Sirte area
originated in the defection to it of local Libya Ansar al-Sharia networks that
had already been involved heavily in governance, going as far back as June
2013.
Considerable documentary evidence points to a sophisticated governance
system in the Sirte area along the lines of what is observed in Syria and Iraq,
including a functioning judiciary (Diwan al-Qada wa al-Mazalim) that deals
with matters ranging from marriage contracts to real estate; an Islamic police
force; a Dawa and Masajid branch responsible for outreach to the population
and control of the affairs of the mosques; repentance programs and sharia
sessions as part of a cooptation of local personnel structures; conciliation initiatives;
and the introduction of the zakat taxation system (falling under the
Diwan al-Zakat wa al-Sadaqat). The Sirte area, therefore, represents the most
developed IS governance project outside of Iraq and Syria; it is thus hardly
surprising that Adnani mentioned the city alongside Mosul and Raqqa
in a speech released in late May 2016 that partly attempted to hit back at
the coalition’s claims of progress against IS on account of territorial losses.
Indeed, IS control of the Sirte area is coming into doubt in the face of rival
local forces beginning to direct their efforts against it.
Elsewhere in Libya, IS has found itself a military combatant in Benghazi
against forces loyal to Khalifa al-Haftar, while a more covert presence was
maintained in Sabratha, to the west of Tripoli city, as part of the running of
a suspected training camp for militants, only to be targeted by U.S. airstrikes
in February 2016. Meanwhile, the Fezzan province that represents Libya’s
third major region has shown no sign of governance projects, and, as with
Algeria province, information has been very sporadic.
In short, IS’s ability to realize governance (tamkin) has been very limited
thus far in the wider region beyond Iraq and Syria—an observation that has
implications for IS’s credibility on the global stage, particularly in appealing
for support from the wider jihadist movement. Since IS puts such great
emphasis on being a state, the lack of success in replicating elsewhere its
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