BEYOND SYRIA IRAQ

MATTHEW LEVITT
rounding coastline. IS also conducted operations in Libya’s oil crescent and in
Sabratha, near the Tunisian border. IS Libya also suffered losses at the hands
of militia groups, however, particularly in the eastern city of Darnah. 12
Meanwhile, IS in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula became more lethal and sophisticated,
according to the State Department. 13 The most prominent indicators
of its development were its multipronged attack in the North Sinai town of
Sheikh Zuwaid in July 2015 and the downing of Russian Metrojet 9286 in
October 2015 that killed 224 passengers and 7 crew members.
Beyond these two significant offshoots, the IS-aligned groups that have
popped up in other parts of the Middle East and all over the world vary
widely in their relationships to IS core, their capabilities, their motivations,
and their connections to the local communities The most prominent IS
affiliate outside the Middle East is the Nigeria-based terrorist group Boko
Haram, which declared its affiliation to IS in March 2015. Boko Haram is
responsible for thousands of deaths and a burgeoning displaced-persons crisis
in the Lake Chad basin region of Africa. This most destructive of IS’s
affiliates has a questionable relationship with IS core, however, despite its
baya (oath of allegiance) to IS over a year ago.
ANALYSIS OF THE THREAT, AND LOOKING AHEAD
In light of the rise of IS provinces over the past eighteen months, it is high
time to address the many questions they raise.
What are their future prospects? IS core is hurting financially. How long
will IS in Sinai last, should IS be unable to continue providing funds?
Its significant loss of territory in Iraq and Syria means the Islamic State is no
longer “remaining and expanding.” With statehood and expansion as central
aspects of its identity, how long will IS be seen as a “caliphate,” the most attractive
Sunni jihadist group? These defeats in IS core bring the potential for the
group to lash out abroad in an attempt to assert its relevance. Will territorial
and financial setbacks prompt IS to press for its provinces to do more to remain
relevant and project power? Will it press for more terrorist attacks abroad?
What impact would military success against IS in Iraq have on the remaining
IS core in Syria and on IS provinces? What impact would diplomatic
success in Syria have on IS provinces? Will IS periphery get more lethal and
ultraviolent as the core collapses or less so, because it is no longer receiving
weapons, money, and, in some cases, leaders, from Iraq and Syria? Will infighting
increase as fighters return from Syria and Iraq, with the status that comes
with having fought in those locations, and challenge local leaders for power?
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