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PROVINCE TIES TO THE ISLAMIC STATE CORE<br />
IS in the Sinai<br />
■ MOKHTAR AWAD<br />
PREPARED STATEMENT<br />
THE ISLAMIC STATE’Sso-called Sinai Province, or Wilayat Sinai, has been<br />
the most active affiliate outside the group’s base in Libya, thus posing a<br />
threat to both Egypt’s and Israel’s security. This local affiliate, formerly<br />
called Ansar Beit al-Maqdis (ABM), witnessed a remarkable improvement in<br />
capability since it pledged allegiance to IS in November 2014. Its attacks have<br />
been far more frequent and lethal, and have utilized increasingly advanced<br />
weapons and tactics.<br />
The group’s enhanced capabilities, coupled with a shift in tactics to increased<br />
targeting of civilians and carrying out operations that advance the interests of<br />
core IS—such as the downing of a Russian airliner in October 2015—suggest<br />
a strong connection to the core leadership. I argue that core IS has succeeded<br />
in “subsuming” the local Sinai affiliate. This means a successful “integration,”<br />
wherein local leaders operate as subordinate lieutenants serving IS interests<br />
without the need for constant communication with or direction from core IS.<br />
Despite the obvious shifts in the group’s behavior, however, from which<br />
we can intelligently infer a strong connection, information in the public<br />
domain about direct connections between Sinai and IS core and how they<br />
take place is lacking. Such communications have, indeed, taken place and<br />
still do, and this paper will shed light on such contacts.<br />
Also to be considered here is the success the Islamic State has had in utilizing<br />
its Sinai host to help it spread into the Egyptian mainland and Western<br />
Desert, the latter with help also from its Libya base. Although the extent to<br />
which IS core centrally directs such operations isn’t known, the nature of<br />
mainland and Western Desert operations strongly suggests a strategic direction<br />
that advances its interests.<br />
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