BEYOND SYRIA IRAQ

SOCIAL MEDIA
the defender of the Sunni population. The group’s toxic leadership, however—
which can be discerned from social media coverage of the conflict—has made
it unable thus far to take full advantage of the apparent opportunity.
In October 2014, a group calling itself Supporters of the Caliphate in
the Arabian Peninsula released a statement pledging baya to Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi. The group vowed to confront the Houthis with a “fierce, brutal,
and crushing response beyond limits” and threatened to behead and burn
all Houthis. 7 In November 2014, Baghdadi accepted the pledge of allegiance
from IS’s supporters in Yemen. 8
IS’s Yemen branch created an official media wing soon after its creation. 9
IS supporters created an Arabic-language hashtag on Twitter to promote the
group’s new Yemen presence. IS members in Yemen quickly faced pressure
from outside supporters to mobilize to action in the country (see metric
number 4, above, regarding IS kinetic action). In a statement posted to a
jihadist forum in January 2015, an IS media operative urged IS to “seize this
opportunity” and defend Yemen’s Sunnis “before it becomes too late.” 10 The
operative said Yemen’s Sunni tribes would soon be defeated if IS did not
come to their rescue.
In March 2015, IS announced the creation of separate administrative
units in Yemen. On March 2, it released a statement announcing the establishment
of Wilayat Lahij, a territory that encompasses southwestern Yemen.
IS vowed the Houthis’ actions would “not go without accountability and
punishment,” and said it would carry out attacks against the Houthis “in the
upcoming days.” 11 Masked IS gunmen distributed leaflets of the statement
in the governorates of Lahij, Hadramawt, Ibb, Shabwa, and Sana. 12 After
distributing the statement in Lahij, IS deployed dozens of gunmen who
patrolled the streets with rocket-propelled grenade launchers and machine
guns. 13 These actions were designed to advertise IS’s presence through a show
of force.
Soon after the leaflets were distributed, IS made good on its threats against
the Houthis. On March 20, 2015, suicide bombers attacked two mosques
frequented by Houthis in Sana, killing 137 in the deadliest terrorist attack in
Yemen’s history. The group followed this attack with a barrage of propaganda
highlighting its expansion into Yemen. 14 Since then, IS has claimed several
additional operations against Houthi mosques. 15
But despite this audacious entry into Yemen, IS’s poor local leadership
and a more powerful regional jihadist group would constrain its growth. Al-
Qaeda’s network in Yemen—in the form of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Penin-
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