BEYOND SYRIA IRAQ

LOCAL POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THE ISLAMIC STATE
Public Polling
■ DAVID POLLOCK
PREPARED STATEMENT
POPULAR SUPPORT IS LIKELYnot the determinant of how the Islamic
State gains or maintains power, but it is almost certainly a factor in
that equation. Active support, passive sympathy, or at least prevailing
acceptance from local populations would all intuitively make an IS takeover
and subsequent control of a given territory more feasible and sustainable.
Conversely, the loss of such popular backing or acquiescence, or the active
hostility of a local population, would probably make it harder for IS to hang
onto power in certain specific locations. Arguably, IS could then find it more
difficult to extract revenues and recruits and perhaps be compelled to divert
attention and resources from jihad to internal patrols. Such a situation might
even, especially in combination with outside pressure, help overthrow or
expel IS from at least some portions of its far-flung provinces.
Whatever the degree of validity ascribed to the preceding commonsense
preamble, trying to decipher the precise role of popular support or opposition
in the rise or fall of IS provinces begs a first question: how can we
even know how much, or how little, popular support IS in fact enjoys? From
a methodological standpoint, two quite different cases present themselves.
One is the measurement of popular attitudes in areas either already under
IS rule or violently contested by the group. The second is the measurement
of those attitudes in areas outside IS rule but potentially vulnerable to its
encroachment—in general, predominantly Muslim territories, often, though
not always, near some established IS foothold.
In the first instance—that of IS-ruled or actively disputed areas—any
attempt to measure local public opinion empirically faces obvious, very
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