The Intelligent Troglodyte’s Guide to Plato’s Republic, 2016a

59 The Sun
See 506b-509b. Socrates has us consider the sun and how in the “visible realm” it
shines light upon material things and in this way enables our eyes to see these
things. He then suggests that the form of the good functions similarly in the
“intelligible realm” enabling our soul (presumably the rational part) to understand
“intelligible things” (forms) by shining “truth” upon them. The sun-and-seeing
part of this analogy is straightforward enough. But how is the form of the good
supposed to be able to help us understand the other forms? And what is this
analogue of light, “truth,” by means of which the form of the good is supposed to
be able to illumine the other forms? One reasonable interpretation is to think of it
this way: To understand the form of the beautiful one must know what counts as a
good example of something beautiful, and why. Likewise for the form of green
and for every other form. In general, then, to understand forms is to know the
truth about what constitutes goodness for each kind of thing. But this knowledge
is possible only because there is such a thing as what it is to be good. Indeed, one
is able to identify a good example of something, and do this with knowledge, only
to the extent that the form of the good shines its “truth” upon one’s soul and
informs one’s thinking.
Is understanding essentially a kind of valuing, an appreciation of
something? If so, then can one give an adequate account of what it is to
understand something without discussing what it is to value it?
Socrates is going to suggest later (516a-b, 517b-c) that the form of the good
can illumine other forms before it is itself understood. Can you imagine
how this is possible?
At the end of this passage (509b), Socrates suggests, strangely, that the good
is in some sense “beyond” and “superior to” being. How do you interpret
this?
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