The Intelligent Troglodyte’s Guide to Plato’s Republic, 2016a

pleasures of the body, with sensual things. But this interpretation is too simple,
for Socrates is going to give examples in Book VIII of people who are led by their
appetitive part to dabble at times in politics and at other times in philosophy (or
what they suppose is philosophy), and the pleasures involved in these activities are
not, except accidentally, sensual. What characterizes the appetitive part is not so
much its sensuality as the immediacy and narrowness of its concerns. Socrates is
careful to point out that thirst, as a paradigm example of the appetitive part at
work, is simply the desire for drink, not “for hot drink or cold, or much drink or
little, or – in a word – for drink of a certain sort.” There are times of course,
especially in the heat of summer, when one desires a cold drink. But in cases like
this there are really two different desires at work: one for drink, and one for
cooling down. What it is to be thirsty, as opposed to being both thirsty and
overheated, is to crave one thing: drink (liquid water). Socrates’ thought appears
to be that this sort of craving for some one thing – something that “hits the spot,”
as we say, providing immediate gratification – is the essential characteristic of
appetitive desire. These desires aren’t looking down the road towards what hitting
the spot might lead to in the long run: obesity, poverty, drug addiction, social
unrest (in the case of people who dabble in politics), or what have you. Appetitive
desires are simply concerned with seeing that the spot gets hit. The desires of the
rational part are different. They aspire to order things according to what is good,
all things considered. Notice that Socrates is not saying the rational part is good
and the appetitive part is evil, as if they functioned in the soul like an angel pulling
in one direction and a devil pulling in the other. That this would be a silly view
for him to hold is obvious if one just considers what it would be like, while
remaining a flesh and blood human being, never to get thirsty or to feel the need to
take your next breath (both appetitive desires). Besides, although it is true that the
appetitive part gets people into trouble from time to time, the same can be said of
the rational part. It is the rational part that mistakenly concocts poisonous
medicines, for instance. Nevertheless, as Socrates will explain later, there is a
special relationship between the rational part of the soul and goodness. The
rational part ultimately desires to order things, not just according to what appears
good, but according to what is good. It desires, in other words, the knowledge
characteristic of wisdom.