The Intelligent Troglodyte’s Guide to Plato’s Republic, 2016a
The Intelligent Troglodyte’s Guide to Plato’s Republic, 2016a
The Intelligent Troglodyte’s Guide to Plato’s Republic, 2016a
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95 Rewards from Gods and Human Beings<br />
See 612a-614a. Socrates has argued, at length, that justice in the soul is desirable<br />
for its own sake, so desirable that it is enough <strong>to</strong> bring a person happiness. But as<br />
people who love their jobs ordinarily receive payment for their work, people who<br />
are just are ordinarily rewarded out of appreciation for their virtue. So, for<br />
instance, “if a just man falls in<strong>to</strong> poverty or disease or some of the other things that<br />
seem bad, it will end well for him . . . surely the gods at least will never neglect<br />
anyone who eagerly wishes <strong>to</strong> become just and, by practicing virtue, <strong>to</strong> make<br />
himself as much like a god as a human being can.” Likewise, human beings<br />
generally reward just people (when recognized) with trust and respect, whereas<br />
unjust people (when recognized) are vilified and punished. Justice in the soul is<br />
therefore desirable for its consequences as well as for its own sake.<br />
Would the gods reward a virtuous person if the person, being just, were<br />
already happy? If so, what would be the point?<br />
How might a god reward a person who was already fully just? With<br />
friendship?<br />
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