The Intelligent Troglodyte’s Guide to Plato’s Republic, 2016a

87 An Emblem of the Soul
See 588b-592a. As Book IX draws to a close, Socrates offers us “an image of the
soul in words.” We are to imagine the appetitive part as “a many-headed beast
with a ring of tame and savage heads that it can grow and change at will.” We are
to imagine the spirited part as a lion. And we are to imagine the rational part as a
human being (reason being a distinctively human capacity). The appetitive part is
“much the largest” of the three, while the rational part is the smallest. All are
joined together and set within the “image” of a human being (the human body,
presumably). Socrates uses this emblem to reiterate the conclusion of the overall
argument, that justice is by its very nature beneficial to a person, and to offer some
advice: that we should act so as to put the rational part in control of the soul and
get the spirited part to serve as its ally; that we should get the rational part to care
for the appetitive part “like a farmer, feeding and domesticating the gentler heads
and preventing the savage ones from growing;” and that the result should be
friendship among the parts of the soul. Socrates goes on to use the emblem to
explain how certain conventional vices such as licentiousness, irascibility,
laziness, and slavishness have their roots in injustice. In general, “what is fine is
what subordinates the beastlike elements in our nature to the human one – or
better, perhaps, to the divine, whereas what is shameful is what enslaves the tame
element to the savage.”
Why does Socrates call the rational part of the soul “divine”?
At 590c-d, Socrates suggests that, in a community, “it is better for everyone
to be ruled by a divine and wise ruler – preferably one that is his own and
that he has inside himself; otherwise one imposed on him from outside, so
that we may all be as alike and as friendly as possible . . .” How much
imposition from without would Socrates consider permissible? He says that
a person ruled by the appetitive part “should be the slave of that best person
who has the divine ruler within himself.” But suppose a city were less than
entirely temperate, and the person ruled by the appetitive part were
unwilling to subordinate himself in this way. How far would Socrates be