The Intelligent Troglodyte’s Guide to Plato’s Republic, 2016a

44 The Virtues of the Soul
See 441c-444a. Having established that the soul has an internal structure similar to
that of the city, they use the definition of each of the city’s virtues as a model for
defining each of the soul’s virtues. Wisdom is defined as good judgment, based on
knowledge, concerning what is advantageous for the soul, “both for each part and
for the whole, the community composed of all three.” This presumably includes
judgment about one’s proper relations with other people. Wisdom is a virtue
specifically of the rational part of the soul. Courage is defined as preservation, in
the face of temptations, of well-reasoned beliefs about what should and should not
be feared. Although the rational part does the reasoning, courage is specifically a
virtue of the spirited part of the soul. Temperance is defined as harmony between
the parts of the soul resulting from agreement that the rational part should rule, that
the desires of the spirited and appetitive parts should be controlled by the desires of
the rational part. This is a virtue of the whole soul, of all three parts. Finally,
justice is defined as each part of the soul doing its proper job so that wisdom,
courage, and temperance are cultivated and preserved. This of course is also a
virtue of the whole soul, of all three parts. The just person “puts himself in order,
becomes his own friend, and harmonizes the three elements together . . . and, from
having been many, becomes entirely one, temperate and harmonious. Then and
only then should he turn to action, whether it is to do something concerning the
acquisition of wealth, or concerning the care of his body, or even something
political, or concerning private contracts. In all these areas, he considers and calls
just and fine the action that preserves this inner harmony and helps achieve it.”
Provided the spirited part comes to see it as a matter of honor to defend the
interests of the rational part, it is not hard to see how these two parts of the
soul can be allies. But how is it possible for temperance to include the
myopic appetitive part, so concerned as it is with satisfactions near at hand?
How can the appetitive part appreciate that it is in its interest to be ruled by
the rational part? (Recall the analogous question above, in section 40, about
the workers putting trust in the rulers.) Would Socrates say that the