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The Intelligent Troglodyte’s Guide to Plato’s Republic, 2016a

The Intelligent Troglodyte’s Guide to Plato’s Republic, 2016a

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McDonalds’ hamburger; the rational part, knowing best what pleases the<br />

appetitive part, gets <strong>The</strong> Joy of Cooking down off the shelf. <strong>The</strong> spirited part may<br />

think it wants <strong>to</strong> be widely admired; the rational part, knowing that the only praise<br />

worth having is from a virtuous person, has the spirited part spur the soul on <strong>to</strong> be<br />

worthy of such praise. Because the spirited and appetitive parts are generally<br />

better satisfied in an aris<strong>to</strong>cratic soul, and the rational part is uniquely well<br />

satisfied, it follows that the just person lives the most fulfilling of lives, and is<br />

therefore the happiest of human beings.<br />

So has Socrates successfully met Glaucon’s challenge? Let’s revisit the<br />

ideally just person, alone in his cell, facing death by <strong>to</strong>rture in the morning.<br />

His appetitive part doesn’t have much <strong>to</strong> look forward <strong>to</strong> that isn’t pretty<br />

dreadful. His spirited part, always courageous, does its job and keeps the<br />

appetitive part from whimpering. But how pleasant a job is this? How does<br />

it compare, for instance, with the glory of <strong>to</strong>ppling the tyrant currently<br />

lording over the city (or even with the glory of becoming neighborhood<br />

darts champion)? If Socrates is right, and the just person unjustly facing<br />

death by <strong>to</strong>rture is actually happier than the unjust person widely admired<br />

for his apparent virtues, then the reason for this happiness has <strong>to</strong> come down<br />

<strong>to</strong> those pleasures of the rational part of the soul <strong>to</strong> which the just person has<br />

unique access. Ultimately, if Socrates has a case, it must rest on the special<br />

joy possessed by the philosopher who has come <strong>to</strong> know the forms, and in<br />

particular the form of the good. What would this be like, <strong>to</strong> know the form<br />

of the good? <strong>The</strong> experience Socrates has in mind may be something akin <strong>to</strong><br />

what Buddhists call “enlightenment” or what Western theists call “the<br />

presence of God,” for it is supposed <strong>to</strong> be an encounter between a human<br />

being and that which is of greatest value in reality. Recall the passage from<br />

486a-b: “And do you imagine that a thinker who is high-minded enough <strong>to</strong><br />

look at all time and all being will consider human life <strong>to</strong> be a very important<br />

thing?” “He couldn’t possibly.” “<strong>The</strong>n he won’t consider death <strong>to</strong> be a<br />

terrible thing either, will he?” “Not in the least.” <strong>The</strong> person who comes <strong>to</strong><br />

know the form of the good has, arguably, completed life’s quest. Would<br />

this be happiness?

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