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The Intelligent Troglodyte’s Guide to Plato’s Republic, 2016a

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51 Philosophers and Knowledge of the Forms<br />

See 472a-480a. When asked how it is possible for the just city they have been<br />

describing <strong>to</strong> come in<strong>to</strong> being, Socrates answers that it is not possible unless the<br />

rulers become “philosophers” (literally, lovers of wisdom). But what are<br />

philosophers? People who are “ready and willing <strong>to</strong> taste every kind of learning”<br />

and are “insatiable for it”; people who are “lovers of seeing the truth”; and above<br />

all, people who “are passionately devoted <strong>to</strong> and love the things with which<br />

knowledge deals,” the “forms.” What are these things seen and embraced by the<br />

philosophers, these forms? Socrates encourages us <strong>to</strong> consider one of them, “the<br />

beautiful itself.” Unlike “the many beautiful things” (this particular person, that<br />

particular song, etc.), which, depending upon one’s point of view, appear in some<br />

respects <strong>to</strong> be beautiful and yet in other respects ugly – or in fancy language,<br />

“partake in both being and not being” with respect <strong>to</strong> beauty – the beautiful itself<br />

“is” beautiful “completely.” People who fail <strong>to</strong> see and embrace the form of the<br />

beautiful may think they know what they are talking about when they say that this<br />

person is beautiful or that song is beautiful, but they have mere “belief”; only the<br />

person who grasps the form, who truly understands the nature of beauty, has<br />

“knowledge.” This is an early statement of a position that philosophers have come<br />

<strong>to</strong> call realism about universals. A modern day proponent of this view might<br />

explain it this way: Certain things exist, “universals” such as what it is <strong>to</strong> be<br />

beautiful, what it is <strong>to</strong> be green, what it is <strong>to</strong> be three in number, or what it is <strong>to</strong> be<br />

a knife. <strong>The</strong>se things are capable, typically, of having “particular instances,” such<br />

as this beautiful face, that green leaf, those three pebbles, or the knife on the table,<br />

and it is in virtue of sharing a universal feature that particulars are correctly said <strong>to</strong><br />

be similar. (Not that every universal must have instances: e.g., what it is <strong>to</strong> be a<br />

square circle, or what it is <strong>to</strong> be nonexistent.) Universals exist independent of their<br />

instances; what it is <strong>to</strong> be a dinosaur, for example, still exists even though<br />

dinosaurs don’t. Universals also exist independent of our minds; what it is <strong>to</strong> be a<br />

dinosaur existed before human beings ever imagined dinosaurs and will continue<br />

<strong>to</strong> exist should we ever cease <strong>to</strong> think about them. Finally, universals are the sort<br />

of thing that can be known, and <strong>to</strong> know such a thing is <strong>to</strong> understand the essence

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