The Intelligent Troglodyte’s Guide to Plato’s Republic, 2016a

part, it will be clear that he thinks it desires honor above all – the esteem of other
people – and that it therefore lies at the root of a number of important
interpersonal concerns: praise, blame, shame, guilt, resentment, revenge,
ambitious competitiveness, and concern for reputation. So when Leontius gets
angry at himself, it is most likely out of shame. He doesn’t want to be known as
the sort of person who has a strong appetitive desire to gaze at corpses. It may be
helpful to think of the concerns of the spirited part falling in between those of the
appetitive part and the rational part. The appetitive part desires to do for the
moment what appears to be pleasant at the moment. The rational part desires to
take all relevant concerns into account and do whatever is best. The spirited part
desires to achieve something in between – the esteem of other people. (Students
who have read some Freud often wonder whether his “id,” “ego,” and “superego”
are supposed to be the same things as the appetitive, spirited, and rational parts of
the soul. Although Freud’s id is similar to Socrates’ appetitive part, and the
superego – focusing as it does on delaying gratification for the sake of higher
social goods – is similar to the rational part, Freud’s ego is nothing like the spirited
part. Freud imagines the ego seeking compromise and balance between the
opposing elements of the id and superego. But the spirited part as Socrates
describes it has desires all its own, and in a just soul, these desires are to be
satisfied only when subordinated to the desires of the rational part. Justice is best
thought of, not as a mediated conflict, but as a benevolent monarchy.)
Some students think Socrates’ examples involving what he takes to be the
spirited part of the soul are better explained by supposing that either the
rational part or the appetitive part is flaring up in passion. Consider,
however, the case of a competitive wrestler who denies himself food so as
to be able to “make weight” (weigh-in low on the day of the match so as to
achieve a competitive edge). The wrestler’s drive to win can plainly be set
in simultaneous opposition to his appetitive drive to eat. But now suppose
his rational part is also pitted against his competitive drive, pulling away
from this thirst for victory-at-any-cost and towards a more balanced,
thoughtful, integrated life. It would seem that the wrestler’s appetitive and
rational desires are both pitted against a third desire. Is this example