Jaarboek Thomas Instituut 1995 - Thomas Instituut te Utrecht

THEOLOGY OF PROVOCATIVE RECEPTIVITY 19
manner typical and characteristic for his style in this book. "What our
colleague B writes about Bach and Händel and what our colleague H.
writes about Gregorian chant is - with permission - nonsense.
Gregorian chant is wonderful. Bach is a genius and Händel: no
defamatory word about that man. But why should the dogmatician give
way to the poet? Perhaps because it is a little difficult. And because
Bach is available, while dogmatically so much work still has to be
done. Why is imagery closer to eternity than the bare, clear
formulations of the dogmatician. (Difficult, I admit, can't do it
myself, ok, but Bach can't do it at all and can certainly not take over
from me). In my opinion, the glass of water of the bare dogmatic
theology gives more insight and clarity into the mystery (mystery!,
certainly!, that remains!) than a full length Bach concert. Because we
would form false representations and ideas about eternal life. Kreling
would certainly have remarked that the mystery character of eternal
life would also be less clear, if we would replace the ascesis of stark
and bare thinking with concealing and rich imagery. Faith searching
for understanding, demands that we do not abandon thinking and
concept" (31, p. 32).
This insistence on concepts and conceptual clarity implies, as
is clear from this quotation, a distinction in uses of language and types
of language, a distinction between metaphors and anthropomorphisms
on the one hand and concepts on the other hand. This distinction does
not imply that there is no relation between the two languages - the
metaphorical language provides the necessary material for the
conceptual language -, let alone that the metaphorical language should
be rejected or discarded. The metaphorical language belongs to the
level of preaching and catechesis. But the distinction does point to the
danger of confusion, as if theology and preaching are the same, and
points to the need of theological reflection. "Where should one look
for the pure concept of God, if theology is not interested in it" (30, p.
91).
This insistence on concepts and this attention to receptivity
imply also a view on faith, an analysis fidei. Faith is not to be seen
solely in terms of affect and religious experience, but also and
primarily in terms of human intellect, an assensus intellectus (cf. 30,
pp. 73-74). This does not mean that faith is reduced to some form of
rationalism, excluding other aspects, functions and capacities of the