21. und 22. Mai X. Internationale ... - Bundeskartellamt

I am concerned, however, that people have tended to overlook the risk that
exchanges can be designed in a way that impairs the emergence of new
exchanges or other innovative distribution alternatives. Competition between
exchanges is very important. First of all, consumers and suppliers benefit directly
from competition between exchanges, even in a winner-take-all market. In other
words, there is benefit from the competition to become the dominant exchange.
Second, it is important to be sure that, if a dominant exchange does emerge, it
does not use exclusionary practices and rules to prevent the emergence of new,
innovative, next-generation competitors.
It is becoming increasingly common for suppliers to form exchanges, sometimes
in response to exchanges formed by independent non-suppliers. This can be
problematic for two reasons. First, there is no reason to assume that a supplierowned
exchange will have a monopoly on innovation; indeed, there have been
circumstances in which the real innovation has come from sources outside the
supplier industry. Second, the motives of participants in a supplier-owned
exchange may differ from those of independent operators. An independent
operator presumably will try to adopt rules and practices that reduce transaction
costs and facilitate comparison shopping. It will do these things in order to make
its exchange attractive to users. Participants in a supplier-owned exchange,
however, may have multiple motives. They may well want to reduce transaction
costs. But, as suppliers of products being sold on the exchange, their primary
concern may be to maintain the status quo and to prevent innovations that might
benefit customers of the exchange at the expense of suppliers to the exchange.
These factors suggest certain guidelines in the application of the antitrust laws to
B2B and B2C exchanges. We start with the recognition that these ventures are
new undertakings that may have very substantial benefits in the marketplace,
and thus there should be a presumption of nonintervention unless a competitive
problem can be identified. Furthermore, when intervention is appropriate, it
should be tailored to the identified problem so that we are able to retain the
competitive benefits that exchanges provide.
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