Privacy and Injunctions - Evidence - Parliament

Robert Rogers, Clerk of the House of Commons—Written evidence
Prosecutions in issuing his statement on 20 April 1978 amounted to a contempt of the
House.
7. In Your Committee’s view the terms of the statement, issued on the Director's
instructions require to be examined with care. Its first sentence was no more than a factual
statement, which drew attention. to the undisputed fact that the legality 'of revealing the
identity of Colonel “B” was already the subject matter of proceedings then pending in the
courts. No complaint could be made of this. Its second sentence, couched in careful
phraseology, reserved the Director's position as to whether the further publication of
Colonel “B”'s name would amount to a contempt of court even if its publication formed
part of a report of proceedings in the House. It is plain from the context and circumstances
that the; Director was not referring, and could not properly have been understood to be
referring, to a report in Hansard (which would be the subject of absolute privilege from civil
or criminal proceedings by virtue of section 1 of the Parliamentary Papers Act 1840) but to
reports in the Press and by the broadcasting authorities.
8. Upon this second sentence two issues of law arise. The first is whether, other matters
apart, the publication of Colonel “B”’s name by the Press and in broadcasts amounted, or
would have amounted, to a contempt of court. The Queen's Bench Divisional Court, in the
case of Attorney General v. Peace News and others, has held that such publication prior to 20
April 1978 did amount to a contempt of court. But leave to appeal to the House of Lords
has been granted and the issue is again sub judice. Your Committee do not comment
further upon that issue.
9. The second issue is whether, assuming that the Divisional Court's view was right,
publication of the name would, by reason, and solely by reason, of its being part of a Press
or broadcast report of what happened in the House, be protected by privilege from
condemnation as a contempt of court. Your Committee do not find it necessary to reach a
final view on this question. They note, however, that when in 1840 Parliament addressed
itself to the problem created by Stockdale v. Hansard, it passed legislation according absolute
protection to the publishers of Parliamentary papers, including the official reporters of its
proceedings in Hansard, but only qualified privilege to anyone who published extracts or
abstracts from Hansard or other Parliamentary papers. The contention that nonetheless
absolute privilege applies to Press reports of speeches made or events occurring in
Parliament seems to Your Committee to be plainly inconsistent with Parliament's intentions
in passing the 1840 Act. Moreover, whilst the 1840 Act applied the privilege to both civil
and criminal proceedings, there are no common law authorities which establish the like
privilege for reports of speeches made or events occurring in Parliament in respect of
criminal proceedings. Your Committee therefore think it improbable that the common law
privilege protecting Press and broadcast reports of proceedings in Parliament extends to
criminal proceedings, including proceedings for contempt of court. They note that the
memoranda submitted by representatives of the media do not claim that it does. Whether it
should is a different question.
10. But even if Your Committee's tentative view that it does not extend so far is ultimately
held to be mistaken, it is plain to Your Committee that the Director was fully entitled to
reserve his position by means of the careful phraseology which he used. That phraseology,
addressed to the media which were seeking guidance, was intended as a warning to them
that they should not regard it as established law that reports of things said in Parliament
were ipso facto protected by privilege against proceedings for contempt of court.
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