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Privacy and Injunctions - Evidence - Parliament

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Ministry of Justice <strong>and</strong> Department for Culture, Media <strong>and</strong> Sport—Written evidence<br />

Protection of privacy prior to the coming into force of the Human Rights Act 1998<br />

5. Prior to the entry into force of the Human Rights Act, a singular right to privacy was<br />

not recognised in the English common law. The absence of such a right was<br />

confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Kaye v Robertson 294 . Bingham LJ said that the<br />

defendants’ conduct towards the claimant was a “monstrous invasion of privacy” <strong>and</strong><br />

it was this which underlay the claimant’s complaint but it alone, however gross, did<br />

not entitle him to any relief in English law. Leggatt LJ said that the right of privacy<br />

“had so long been disregarded here that it can only be recognised by the legislature.”<br />

6. When seeking to protect their privacy, claimants could rely on the protection<br />

afforded by other existing causes of action <strong>and</strong> legislative provisions. For example:<br />

• Breach of confidence (this has long offered protection from publication or other<br />

kinds of misuse of information on the basis that to disclose it would be a breach of<br />

confidentiality. For example, in Prince Albert v Strange 295 an injunction was granted to<br />

prevent the disclosure of private etchings; <strong>and</strong> details of sex lives have also been held<br />

to be confidential 296 ).<br />

• Trespass (a tort which protects legal occupiers whose l<strong>and</strong> or property is interfered<br />

with).<br />

• Nuisance (persistent watching, telephoning etc of an individual can be a nuisance).<br />

• Defamation (there can be a remedy in relation to the publication of private<br />

information where the defamation action concerns information which is discreditable<br />

<strong>and</strong> personal (e.g. sexual or financial). However, there are limitations to the extent<br />

to which defamation can be a remedy for protecting privacy: since justification is a<br />

complete defence, the publication of true but private facts is not actionable. Also,<br />

not all private information will be defamatory so there may be no cause of action in<br />

defamation).<br />

• Malicious falsehood (where the information published is false <strong>and</strong> published with<br />

malice).<br />

• The Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (which protects against conduct causing<br />

alarm, harassment or distress).<br />

Reviews relating to privacy law<br />

7. A number of reviews took place in the years preceding the introduction of the<br />

Human Rights Act which considered issues relating to privacy <strong>and</strong> press regulation.<br />

These included the Younger report (1972) 297 , which focused primarily on the impact<br />

on privacy of technological developments such as surveillance devices; the McGregor<br />

report (1977) 298 , which recommended that the Press Council (which was at that time<br />

responsible for press self-regulation) should apply more stringent st<strong>and</strong>ards in<br />

relation to complaints about invasions of privacy by the press; the Lindop report<br />

294 (1990) Times, 21 March (Court of Appeal)<br />

295 (1849) 2 De Gex & Sm 652.<br />

296 See for example, Stephens v Avery [1988] 1 Ch 449.<br />

297 Report of the Committee on <strong>Privacy</strong> (Cmnd 5012, 1972)<br />

298 Fund Report of the Royal Commission on the Press (Cmnd 6810, 1977)<br />

619

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