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92 THE HISTORY OF HERESIES,
in the Father" (John, x. 38). And this is the difference between
the Divine Persons and human persons with us three persona
constitute three distinct substances, because, though they are of
the same species, they are still three individual substances, and
they are also three distinct natures, for each person has his own
particular nature. In God, however, the Nature or the sub
stance, is not divisible, but is in fact one one Divinity alone,
and, therefore, the Persons, although really distinct, still having
the same Nature and the same Divine substance, constitute one
Divinity alone, only one God.
14. They next object that rule received by all philoso
phers :
"
Things equal to a third are equal
to each other."
Therefore, say they, if the Divine Persons are the same thing as
the Divine Nature, they are also the same among themselves,
and cannot be really distinct. We might answer this by saying,
as before, that a philosophical axiom like this applies very well
to created, but not to Divine things. But we can even give a
more distinct answer to it. This axiom answers very well in
regard to things which correspond to a third, and correspond
also among themselves. But although the Divine Persons cor
respond in every thing to the Divine Essence, and are, therefore,
the same among themselves as to the substance, still, because in
the personality they do not correspond, on account of their rela
tive opposition, for the Father communicates his Essence to the
two other persons, and they receive it from the Father, there
fore, the Person of the Father is really distinct from that of the
Son and of the Holy Ghost, who proceeds from the Father and
the Son.
15. They object, Fourthly that as the Divine Presence is
infinite, therefore it must be but one, for what is infinite in all
perfections, cannot have a second like itself, and that is tho
great proof of the Unity of God ; for if there were many Gods,
one could not possess the perfections of the other, and would
not, therefore, be infinite, nor be God. To this we answer, that
although on account of the infinity of God, there can be no more
Gods than one, still from the infinity of the Divine Persons in
God, it does not follow that there can be only one Divine Person;
for although in God there are three distinct Persons, still each,
through the unity of essence, contains all the perfections of the