12.10.2013 Views

Gulf and European Energy Supply Security - Feem-project.net

Gulf and European Energy Supply Security - Feem-project.net

Gulf and European Energy Supply Security - Feem-project.net

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

<strong>Energy</strong> <strong>Security</strong>: Potential for EU-GCC Cooperation<br />

be changed. The interdependence of producers<br />

<strong>and</strong> consumers is a fundamental feature of EU gas<br />

supplies. On the other h<strong>and</strong>, if the flow is interrupted<br />

or halted, the consuming country experiences great<br />

difficulties in accessing other suppliers. The situation<br />

becomes particularly dangerous when the country<br />

does not possess sufficient storage capacities. In<br />

that case, the country is left with no gas at all <strong>and</strong><br />

is forced to direct its consumption to alternative<br />

energies. This is precisely what happened in the<br />

Balkan region following a dispute between Russia<br />

<strong>and</strong> Ukraine in 2008-2009.<br />

1.1 Armed Conflicts<br />

So far, no major gas-producing country has been<br />

involved directly in a major inter-state conflict (with<br />

the exception of the Russia-Georgia war of 2008). In<br />

the case of armed conflicts involving oil-producing<br />

countries, the situation has proved potentially<br />

dangerous even for third parties located in the vicinity<br />

of the conflict area. In 1984, for example, during the<br />

Iran-Iraq war, Saudi <strong>and</strong> Kuwaiti oil tankers were<br />

attacked while crossing the Arabian <strong>Gulf</strong>. 2 At that<br />

time, Japan was in the first phase of negotiating<br />

an LNG deal with Qatar; the negotiations were<br />

interrupted <strong>and</strong> only resumed a decade later. During<br />

the 2009 Russia-Georgia war, Georgian officials<br />

claimed that Russian bombing had targeted the Baku-<br />

Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. Close to this pipeline also<br />

flows the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline (South<br />

Caucasus), while other important proposed pipelines<br />

could follow the same route. Although the allegation<br />

turned out to be false, it caused concern in Europe as<br />

it showed that a supply axis was under the threat of<br />

collateral damage from a conflict.<br />

However, looking only at countries officially<br />

at war gives an incomplete picture as the majority<br />

of ongoing conflicts today do not fall within the<br />

traditional definition of war. 3 Asymmetrical conflicts<br />

appearing within the environment of a civil or intrastate<br />

war represent the most important category<br />

of armed conflicts now. This has repercussions on<br />

the underst<strong>and</strong>ing of the security of gas supply,<br />

as a producing or transit country that is not per se<br />

involved in a war can still represent a threat when<br />

a part of its territory is affected by conflict. This is<br />

4<br />

particularly the case if the physical infrastructure lies<br />

close to combat zones or within reach of a faction<br />

fighting the central government.<br />

It should be underlined that although no major<br />

gas producer is currently involved in a traditional war,<br />

many are affected in varying degrees by internal<br />

conflicts.<br />

War, therefore, could be an important risk for<br />

gas trade if:<br />

• a producing or transit country is directly involved<br />

in the conflict<br />

• a producing or transit country is located in a<br />

region close to the conflict<br />

•<br />

a gas pipeline takes a route affected by the<br />

conflict<br />

On the basis of historical experience, however,<br />

it can be said that armed conflicts, while they have<br />

greatly impacted prices <strong>and</strong> the development of new<br />

infrastructure, have rarely been the cause of a major<br />

physical disruption. To come back to the example of<br />

the 2008 Russia-Georgia war, all the variables tended<br />

to indicate a military intervention threatening<br />

the oil <strong>and</strong> gas transportation infrastructure; but<br />

nothing happened, showing that the effects of an<br />

armed conflict on the gas infrastructure are highly<br />

unpredictable <strong>and</strong> not always damaging.<br />

1.2 Political Instability<br />

The risk associated with regime change in a<br />

producing country is linked to the possibility of<br />

consequent policy changes affecting gas supplies.<br />

Political instability in gas-producing countries has<br />

never resulted in a cut-off of the physical flow of<br />

gas. However, in some cases, newly-established<br />

governments have forced gas buyers to enter into<br />

a renegotiation of the existing contracts. However,<br />

this is generally the exception as economic interests<br />

take primacy over political or ideological interests.<br />

The governments of producing countries tend to<br />

protect their reputation as reliable suppliers.<br />

To illustrate the risk caused by political instability,<br />

we may refer to two contrasting examples: first,<br />

Algeria after the death of President Boumedienne<br />

<strong>and</strong> second, Qatar in the mid-1990s.<br />

Following the death of President Boumedienne<br />

in 1978, a new administration took charge. They

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!