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Gulf and European Energy Supply Security - Feem-project.net

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now, China has preferred the LNG option. Pipelines<br />

are now on the agenda, <strong>and</strong> a first link to import gas<br />

from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan <strong>and</strong> Turkmenistan<br />

became operational in December 2009. 10<br />

It would take decades for gas flows towards<br />

China to equal those towards Europe. Russian gas<br />

exports to East Asia will continue <strong>and</strong> certainly<br />

exp<strong>and</strong>, but Russia will be able to keep on supplying<br />

Europe <strong>and</strong> slowly exp<strong>and</strong> its Asian markets.<br />

Russia’s internal situation <strong>and</strong> domestic market<br />

are likely to have more direct influence on gas<br />

supply issues than China. Indeed, Russia’s available<br />

export surplus is determined by domestic political<br />

<strong>and</strong> social factors. Two major factors have broad<br />

implications for the security of <strong>European</strong> supplies:<br />

domestic prices <strong>and</strong> investments.<br />

Gas prices in Russia are extremely low compared<br />

to export prices, about $43/1000 cm for industrial<br />

users <strong>and</strong> $32/1000cm for individual users 11 against<br />

around $275/1000cm on average in 2009 for Western<br />

Europe. Western <strong>European</strong> markets represent<br />

70 percent of Gazprom’s profits. Consequently,<br />

Gazprom is constantly pushing the government to<br />

increase domestic prices. The Russian government<br />

has promised to put industrial prices on par with<br />

export prices from 2011. The increase of prices for<br />

individual users is considered too politically sensitive<br />

<strong>and</strong> is likely to remain untouched in the near future.<br />

If Russian industrial prices are increased, <strong>and</strong><br />

the Russian domestic market liberalized, the<br />

consequences for Europe would be very important.<br />

First of all, many observers agree that it would<br />

force Russian industrial infrastructure to become<br />

more efficient. Therefore, if less gas is consumed<br />

domestically, Gazprom (which still holds the state<br />

monopoly on exports) would have larger surpluses<br />

for exports. Those could potentially momentarily<br />

offset the decrease of output due to the lack of<br />

investment.<br />

Another consequence would be the end of<br />

friction between Russia <strong>and</strong> Central Asian producers.<br />

The latter would have no particular incentive to<br />

reach <strong>European</strong> markets if the Russian one offers a<br />

similar price level.<br />

The second problem concerns the lack of<br />

investment in infrastructure <strong>and</strong> exploration. As<br />

Geopolitical Issues of Europe’s Future Gas <strong>Supply</strong><br />

Jonathan Stern recently underlined, 12 <strong>European</strong><br />

gas dem<strong>and</strong> has significantly decreased because of<br />

the crisis <strong>and</strong> is difficult to predict in the long run.<br />

Moreover, if supply capacity became tight, supplies<br />

to the Russian domestic market <strong>and</strong> exports to CIS<br />

countries would likely be reduced before exports to<br />

Europe. It is also important to notice that Russia has<br />

no interest in massive investments in new production<br />

facilities, because tight supply allows prices to be<br />

kept higher than if supply was abundant, <strong>and</strong> it<br />

gives Russia leverage when negotiating contracts.<br />

Moreover, Dasseleer (2008) even notices that a<br />

present abundant supply would promote short-term<br />

deals over long-term take-or-pay contracts. The<br />

uncertainty on the markets <strong>and</strong> the EU’s insistence<br />

on diversifying its imports away from Russia does<br />

not favor accelerated investment; on the other<br />

h<strong>and</strong>, Russia has no particular interest in letting the<br />

situation deteriorate <strong>and</strong> thus risk being short of gas<br />

to fulfil its commitment in the future.<br />

2.2. Nigeria<br />

Nigeria is Africa’s first oil producer <strong>and</strong> also<br />

possesses large gas resources (about 5.22 tcm of<br />

proved reserves according to BP, 2009). The gas<br />

produced so far has largely been flared because<br />

of the lack of the necessary infrastructure. Today<br />

the flaring rate reaches 40 percent of a production<br />

of about 35 bcm/yr; (this rate used to rise up to 75<br />

percent a few years ago), which partly explains<br />

why Nigeria remains below its potential production<br />

capacity (35 bcm in 2008, while Egypt, for example,<br />

produced 59 bcm, according to BP).<br />

The relative distance of Nigeria from its export<br />

markets requires that exports take the form of LNG.<br />

A pipeline <strong>project</strong> connecting Algeria <strong>and</strong> Nigeria<br />

is under study (Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline) but<br />

is subject to too much geopolitical instability to<br />

represent a real step forward for the overall gas<br />

industry. As in many other oil- <strong>and</strong> gas-producing<br />

countries, the government aims at increasing the<br />

domestic consumption of gas as a means to kickstart<br />

the development of the country. Nevertheless,<br />

it is not certain that the state will have the capacity<br />

to do this on a large scale, as the country lacks the<br />

most basic infrastructure.

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