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Gulf and European Energy Supply Security - Feem-project.net

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<strong>Energy</strong> <strong>Security</strong>: Potential for EU-GCC Cooperation<br />

enforcement of the contracts. This can be seen<br />

as referring directly to the <strong>Energy</strong> Charter Treaty,<br />

designed to perform the mentioned tasks, but<br />

still not ratified by Russia.<br />

1.4 Resource Nationalism<br />

Every country in the world is indeed resource<br />

nationalist in the sense that it wants to harvest the<br />

most fruits out of its soil. The reality is that while in<br />

the past International Oil Companies (IOCs) could<br />

easily manage the rate of depletion of the fields<br />

they were operating <strong>and</strong> could easily prospect<br />

foreign territories, nowadays those prerogatives<br />

have fallen back in the h<strong>and</strong>s of the national<br />

governments.<br />

Some authors 7 have argued that the NOCs have<br />

different stakeholders from IOCs <strong>and</strong>, therefore,<br />

a different way of envisaging their activity. They<br />

play an important role in their domestic economies,<br />

need to satisfy actors other than international<br />

investors, <strong>and</strong> sometimes play the role of an<br />

instrument of foreign policy. The maximization of<br />

the benefits is consequently “one of the variables<br />

in the equation” <strong>and</strong> not the only one, which has<br />

led some to argue that NOCs take less efficient<br />

decisions than IOCs. This being said, the situation<br />

greatly varies depending on the country as each<br />

state has a specific attitude, some behaving in more<br />

efficient ways than others.<br />

Resource nationalism is not different from any<br />

other foreign policy issue; countries protect their<br />

interests, like they always have. For example, Saudi<br />

Arabia directs gas to the production of chemicals<br />

<strong>and</strong> uses this resource to propel the industrialization<br />

of the country; therefore, it has no intention to<br />

export gas. Can this be called resource nationalism?<br />

It is rather the logical expression of a development<br />

strategy. The EU will have to deal with this like it<br />

would any other issue of international economics;<br />

resource nationalism per se should not be considered<br />

as a cause for heightened concern.<br />

2.Risk Quantification by source<br />

As we have outlined the major geopolitical<br />

factors threatening the global natural gas industry,<br />

the discussion now needs to be focussed on the<br />

analysis of each major gas source so as to determine<br />

individual weaknesses <strong>and</strong> opportunities.<br />

2.1. Russia<br />

Russia is today the EU’s largest external supplier<br />

of natural gas with about 196 bcm exported in 2008. 8<br />

It is also the country possessing the largest reserves<br />

in the world (44.38 tcm), the second largest producer<br />

(527.5bcm) <strong>and</strong> the largest natural gas exporter.<br />

Russia has been a reliable partner for its main<br />

clients for decades, <strong>and</strong> it is likely to remain one in the<br />

future. Historical experience shows that even during<br />

periods of heightened tensions between the West<br />

<strong>and</strong> the Soviet Union, supplies were not cut. In the<br />

recent past, three unfortunate incidents involving<br />

Europe’s gas supplies occurred, which fuelled fears<br />

<strong>and</strong> motivated many to call for a reduction of the<br />

dependence on Russia <strong>and</strong> an increased quest for<br />

alternative sources, which led to the emergence of<br />

the Nabucco <strong>project</strong>. 9<br />

All Russian gas is exported by pipeline. This<br />

assures the customer at the end of the pipeline that<br />

the gas flow cannot be diverted easily <strong>and</strong> quickly.<br />

When political motivations are balanced by economic<br />

interests, the mutual dependence between Russia<br />

<strong>and</strong> the EU is a factor that limits, to a great extent,<br />

unilateral decisions. On the other h<strong>and</strong>, countries<br />

allowing the pipeline to go through their territories<br />

can exert pressure on either the producer or the<br />

customer. Therefore, Russia is a reliable partner over<br />

the long run, but can present significant risks in the<br />

short term, whether those risks are directly created<br />

by Russia or by third countries.<br />

Russian gas export routes all point in the<br />

direction of Europe <strong>and</strong> are concentrated in Ukraine.<br />

The Ukrainian problem has motivated Russia to find<br />

new routes to reach West <strong>European</strong> markets. Both<br />

the Nord Stream <strong>and</strong> South Stream <strong>project</strong>s follow<br />

this logic.<br />

The growing ties between Russia <strong>and</strong> China have<br />

been deemed to have the potential to divert gas<br />

flows away from Europe. Chinese energy needs have<br />

grown dramatically in the last few years, but the usage<br />

of natural gas remains relatively limited. However,<br />

several import <strong>project</strong>s have caught the attention<br />

of observers. For the small volumes imported until

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