Gulf and European Energy Supply Security - Feem-project.net

70bcm/yr by 2020. Even if only a fraction of this
amount is devoted to export, this represents a
very large potential supply for the EU and for the
Nabucco pipeline. However, Shah Deniz will reach
a plateau by 2020 and start declining afterwards.
Moreover, Gazprom announced last April 2009 that
it would start purchasing Azeri gas at European
prices ($350/1000cm according to the newspaper
Kommersant) in 2010. It is clear that this move
is intended primarily at attacking the viability of
Nabucco, as Russia used to be a supplier of gas to
Azerbaijan, not vice versa. Consequently, Nabucco
needs a much wider country base to be profitable.
Moreover, the Gazprom’s South Stream project
connecting Russia to Bulgaria with a pipeline under
the Black Sea is a serious threat to the completion
of Nabucco, as two projects of large capacities in
the region would be mutually exclusive.
The region has large reserves and a significant
export potential, but the instability of the
commitment of the most important potential
suppliers as well as the potential competition to
access those reserves significantly reduces its
attractiveness. In terms of reserves, many of the
countries presenting large potential are not the
easiest to deal with, such as Iran, Turkmenistan and
Iraq; Qatar, on the other hand, offers much more
interesting perspectives.
2.5.1 the Caspian Basin and Central Asia: the
new Great Game
In Central Asia, the most important resources
Table 1: Greater Caspian Basin Proven Reserves
Proven Reserves at end 2008
Trillion cubic meters
Share of
world total Rank
Iran 29.61 16.0% 2
Turkmenistan 7.94 4.3% 4
Iraq 3.17 1.7% 12
Kazakhstan 1.82 1.0% 18
Uzbekistan 1.58 0.9% 21
Azerbaijan 1.20 0.6% 25
Source: BP 2009
Geopolitical Issues of Europe’s Future Gas Supply
are located on the Eastern side of the Caspian
Sea (mainly Turkmenistan – and, in fact, mostly in
Eastern Turkmenistan, close to the Afghan border).
From there, only three routes can be taken to
establish a link to Europe:
• through Russia, which makes no sense as it is
precisely what the EU wants to avoid.
• through Iran, which would make much sense
geographically and geologically, as the country
possesses the second largest reserves in the world
and a pipeline connecting southern Turkmenistan
and Iran already exists; it was initially designed
to supply gas to Iran and Turkey and later on to
Europe. It was not completed not only because
of the lower-than-expected Turkish natural gas
needs but also because of Turkmenistan’s lack
of real commitment to any project bypassing
Russia. Also, a major impediment resides in the
well-publicized poor political characteristics of
Iran and its difficult relations with the Western
world. Although Europe would greatly benefit
from Iranian gas, it seems politically unfeasible for
the moment because of international sanctions
on Iran (also threatening Western companies
having activities in Iran) and because of manifest
demonstrations of aggressiveness coming from
the Iranian side.
• Directly across the Caspian Sea and into Turkey.
This third route would be an effective alternative
and could help materialize the hoped-for fourth
corridor. It could, for instance, fill up Nabucco.
But there are three reasons why the Trans-
Caspian route is potentially hazardous. First of
all, a pipeline under the Caspian Sea would need
to be built, and this is impossible as long as the
territorial status of the sea is not settled. Secondly,
it crosses the Caucasus, which is far from being
a model of stability. Finally, the reliability of the
supply on the Turkmen and Kazakh ends is far
from guaranteed. One could also add that the
cost of the project would be prohibitive.
Concerning the legal status of the Caspian Sea,
Bahgat (2007) writes:
“According to the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea, nations bordering a sea may
claim 12 miles from shore as their territorial waters
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