Hayek's The Constitution of Liberty - Institute of Economic Affairs

h ay e k ’ s t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f l i b e r t y
e c o n o m i c p o l i c y a n d t h e r u l e o f l aw
Taxation and compulsory military service are prime examples
of justifiable coercion where no rules have been broken. Hayek
grants that government’s resources come from taxation and that
taxes are coercive (see 144, 222). Taxpayers are coerced, even
though they have not violated the law. Coercive taxation is justified
by the community’s interest in supplying government with
needed resources. As for military service, the community must be
protected against its enemies, and protection requires a military
force. How can government legitimately compel a draftee to
submit to a kind of servitude, kill perhaps innocent people, and
even face death himself? Coercing draftees, like taxation, is justifiable
on the grounds that it serves the interest of the community.
Generally speaking, the law aims to make state coercion
both predictable and avoidable. If I can predict what actions will
result in my punishment, I can try to avoid those actions. In the
absence of law, state coercion is arbitrary; it is neither predictable
nor avoidable. Taxation and compulsory military service occupy
something of a middle ground between strict adherence to the
Rule of Law and arbitrariness. Taxation and compulsory military
service are not to be avoided, but to the extent that they follow
some rule, they are at least predictable forms of coercion and
therefore are not arbitrary. This consideration largely deprives
such policies ‘of the evil nature of coercion’ (143).
There are other policy measures where Hayek appeals to the
community’s interest in order to justify coercion. He will follow
this path, for example, in arguing that government may force individuals
to insure themselves against risk:
Once it becomes the recognized duty of the public to
provide for the extreme needs of old age, unemployment,
sickness, etc., irrespective of whether the individuals
could and ought to have made provision themselves, and
particularly once help is assured to such an extent that
it is apt to reduce individual efforts, it seems an obvious
corollary to compel them to insure (or otherwise provide)
against those common hazards of life.
Hayek goes on to explain that the ‘justification in this case is
not that people should be coerced to do what is in their individual
interest but that, by neglecting to make provision, they would
become a charge to the public’ (285–6). Also, government has
the right to expropriate property at fair market value to provide
such amenities as parks and recreation, ‘so long as the community
approves this’ in full awareness of the costs and alternatives
(375). Education up to a minimum standard can be made compulsory.
The justification, aside from the contribution to democratic
governance, is that ‘all of us will be exposed to less risks and
will receive more benefits from our fellows if they share with us
certain basic knowledge and beliefs’ (377). Higher education is not
compulsory, but the case for subsidising it ‘must rest not on the
benefit it confers on the recipient but on the resulting advantages
for the community at large’ (382–3).
140
141