Hayek's The Constitution of Liberty - Institute of Economic Affairs

h ay e k ’ s t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f l i b e r t y
m a j o r i t y r u l e a n d l i m i t e d g o v e r n m e n t
so, he concludes that ‘democracy is probably the best form of
limited government’ or, stated more cautiously, that majority rule
is perhaps ‘the least evil of those forms of government from which
we have to choose’ (116, 403).
Hayek identifies ‘three chief arguments by which democracy
can be justified, each of which may be regarded as conclusive.’
First, counting numbers is less wasteful than fighting in
determining which among conflicting opinions has the stronger
support: ‘Democracy is the only method of peaceful change that
man has yet discovered.’ A second argument – very important
historically though perhaps not always valid now – is that ‘the
prospects of individual liberty are better in a democracy than
under other forms of government.’ This is because democracy
fosters certain qualities, such as courage and industry, which
inspire and safeguard individual liberty. Also, ‘since coercive
power must in fact always be exercised by a few,’ its abuse is less
likely if it can be revoked by the many who must submit to it.
A third argument – in Hayek’s view the most powerful one – is
that democratic institutions improve ‘the general level of understanding
of public affairs.’ What Hayek has chiefly in mind here
is the way majority opinion is formed through debate among
contending views. Democratic opinion is not static, but grows
out of a dynamic process that favours the progress of knowledge.
Hayek can thus agree with Tocqueville that ‘democracy is the only
effective method of educating the majority.’ Also, when knowledge
is diffused broadly, a wide range of persons is available from
which to select those who will govern (107–9).
Democracy is a procedure only
Limiting the popular majority is a pressing concern for Hayek;
and his solution is tied up with his insistence that democracy
is only a method or procedure for reaching decisions, with no
fixed aims of its own. As we have seen, Hayek regards majority
rule as the safest and most successful way for the community to
reach important decisions, and he defends democracy on this
basis alone. Democracy is a means and not an end in itself. It is
a method or procedure for deciding on common ends, but it has
no ends of its own (106; cf. 109). Democracy as such ‘indicates
nothing about the aims of government’ (104). This means that
liberals and democrats are both wrong in connecting democracy
to a substantive end: i.e. to freedom or to equality.
What Hayek says about majority rule in the community
must be seen in this light. Hayek requires that majority rule be
consistent with the community’s common beliefs or principles,
but initially at least he leaves open the content of those beliefs or
principles. From this standpoint, it would seem that democracy is
consistent with fascism or with what J. L. Talmon has called ‘totalitarian
democracy’ (56), if this is what the community believes in.
Certainly it is consistent with socialism: ‘when the opinion of the
community decides what different people shall receive, the same
authority must also decide what they shall do’ (232).
Detaching democracy from fixed ends or principles opens
the door to oppression; and Hayek offers two ways around this
problem. One solution is to require that majority decisions take
the form of general rules: ‘So long as democracy constrains the
individual only by general rules of its own making, it controls
the power of coercion’ (116). It is dangerous for democracy to go
beyond this and specify ends to be achieved, since this will extend
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