Hayek's The Constitution of Liberty - Institute of Economic Affairs

h ay e k ’ s t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f l i b e r t y
t h e u s e a n d l i m i t s o f k n o w l e d g e
portrayed in his ‘ideal.’ Later I will consider Hayek’s ideal and its
foundations, but now we must sum up what we learn about moral
obligation from his discussion of values.
Ordinary morality is based on an unquestioned imperative to
obey established rules, but this is not Hayek’s last word on moral
obligation as such. First of all, it leaves no room for novelty, which
is essential to the progress of civilisation. Often it is desirable that
the individual should be able to transgress established moral rules
– voluntary ones and not those imposed coercively by the state –
‘when it seems to him worthwhile to incur the odium which this
will cause.’ Furthermore, the social pressure enforcing these rules
should be variable, so as to ‘allow for gradual and experimental
change’ (63). Where individuals and groups simultaneously
observe partially different rules, there is a greater opportunity
‘for the selection of the more effective ones’ (63). Such flexibility
makes gradual evolution and spontaneous growth possible and
permits modification and improvements in light of new experience
(63). Clearly civilised life is marked by a tension between the
traditional and the novel. A question left open here is the source
of the innovator’s values.
Taking the long view, Hayek insists that a process of selection
is at work in society’s evolution, winnowing out moral rules that
might be destructive to society and preserving those that favour its
survival or persistence. Sometimes he speaks of broader achievements,
such as ‘success,’ but he stops well short of Nietzsche’s
idea that every people creates and honours those values that make
them ‘rule and triumph and shine, to the awe and envy of their
neighbors’ (Nietzsche, 1954: 170). For Hayek, the will to survive,
and not the will to power, drives the evolutionary process.
Hayek’s moral principles are no derivative from evolutionary
theory. Individuals cannot possibly be under an imperative to
follow moral rules that will, in the long run, ensure society’s
survival or success, since the future is unpredictable. Only rarely
can we know what the eventual results of our actions will be. Even
when a group or nation follows the teachings of what it regards as
its best men, it may ‘destroy itself by the moral beliefs to which it
adheres.’ When it comes to the values that preserve society, these
are selected by an impersonal evolutionary process and not by
far-sighted individuals. Imagining that we can foresee or plan the
future is a rationalistic illusion. The best we can do is to maintain
a free society, where individuals can choose among competing
ideals, and to cultivate diverse human capacities. In such a society,
destructive tendencies are ‘self-corrective,’ since ‘groups guided
by “impractical” ideals would decline, and others, less moral by
current standards, would take their place’ (67).
I close on a cautionary note. Hayek provides two separate and
somewhat different accounts of value in The Constitution of Liberty.
The first account – the one that we have just now explored – is
developed chiefly in Chapter 4, in connection with the discussion
of tradition, moral rules and opinion. Here Hayek emphasises that
moral rules typically demand unconditional obedience from the
individual and that social pressure to conform to moral rules is
both potent and beneficial. The second discussion of value comes
in Chapter 6, in connection with a discussion of justice and its
relation to economics. Here Hayek insists that society values the
‘results’ of the individual’s actions more than his moral merit,
implying some relaxation in conformist pressures. The two discussions
differ in tone, if not in substance, although both strongly
defend freedom of action. Whether their discussions of values and
moral rules can be reconciled remains to be seen.
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