Hayek's The Constitution of Liberty - Institute of Economic Affairs

h ay e k ’ s t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f l i b e r t y
i n d i v i d ua l f r e e d o m , c o e r c i o n a n d p r o g r e s s
to that imposed by the state? As Hayek explains it, we conform
to moral rules mostly from habit, but social pressure to do so
is often intense. J. S. Mill had regarded such conformity as the
most pressing contemporary threat to freedom, greater even
than the threat of state coercion (Mill, 1975: 57–69). Hayek is less
concerned than Mill with protecting private conduct ‘from the
pressure of opinion or disapproval.’ Mill, in strongly attacking
this so-called moral coercion, ‘probably overstated the case for
liberty’ (146; cf. 435, n. 32). In Hayek’s view, it is better ‘not to
represent as coercion the pressure that public approval or disapproval
exerts to secure obedience to moral rules and conventions’
(146).
Hayek thinks that ‘a free society will function successfully only
if the individuals are in some measure guided by common values;’
and this is why he is willing for society to exert pressure on individuals
to conform to moral rules. Nonetheless, he doesn’t want
this pressure to interfere with the individual’s freedom of choice.
We must recognise that ‘each person has his own scale of values
which we ought to respect, even if we do not approve of it.’ If we
believe in freedom, we will not ‘regard ourselves as the ultimate
judges of another person’s values’ or ‘feel entitled to prevent him
from pursuing ends which we disapprove of so long as he does not
infringe the equally protected sphere of others.’ A society that fails
to recognise these principles ‘can have no respect for the dignity of
the individual and cannot really know freedom’ (79).
Freedom of action
What is to count as coercion, especially the arbitrary kind that
encroaches on individual freedom? Hayek certainly wishes to
protect individuals and their property from physical harm, but
his primary emphasis is on assuring the individual’s freedom of
action. Inflicting physical harm, or threatening it, is a form of
coercion, but so is interference with free action. Freedom of action
includes economic liberty, but it is wider than this. For Hayek, it
encompasses the individual’s freedom to plan his own life and to
carry out that plan. Recognising that this requires extensive information,
Hayek defines coercion broadly to include the manipulation
of a person’s environment by such means as deception
or withholding vital facts. Coercion, in this wider sense, is ‘the
control of the essential data of an individual’s action by another’
(139).
In extending this freedom to every individual, Hayek implicitly
follows the principle, famously articulated by Kant, that human
individuals are to be regarded as ends and not as a means only. A
person who is coerced no longer pursues his own ends or plan of
life, but must act according to ends or goals that are imposed by
someone else. In so acting I become merely a means to another’s
end. I still exercise choice, but ‘my mind is made someone else’s
tool, because the alternatives before me have been so manipulated
that the conduct that the coercer wants me to choose becomes
for me the least painful one’ (133). I have been deprived of the use
of my intelligence and knowledge in the pursuit of my own aims
(134).
But why is it beneficial that the individual should be free to
pursue his own ends or life plan? Hayek is somewhat vague about
the benefit that the individual himself gains from such freedom.
He does not justify it as a path to success in amassing property,
winning acclaim, cultivating virtue, or attaining happiness: ‘we
must recognize that we may be free and yet miserable’ (18). Hayek
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