Hayek's The Constitution of Liberty - Institute of Economic Affairs

h ay e k ’ s t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f l i b e r t y
i n d i v i d ua l f r e e d o m , c o e r c i o n a n d p r o g r e s s
Moreover, civilisation was necessary to man’s development as a
rational being, for ‘human reason has grown and can successfully
operate’ only with and within the framework of morals, language
and law. It follows that free institutions were not constructed to
fit some rational conception of freedom. Free institutions evolved
first, and conceptions of liberty came later as these institutions
were studied (57–60).
When Hayek refers to ‘classical liberalism,’ he means the form
it took in the nineteenth century, after the anti-rationalism of
thinkers such as Hume, Adam Smith and Burke became widely
influential. His broad aim is to recover and restate classical
liberalism as thus understood. Besides emphasising the social
dimension of human life, classical liberalism developed ideas
about markets that Adam Smith and other evolutionists had put
forward. It did not envision unbridled individualism or complete
laissez-faire – a doctrine that belongs to the French rationalist
tradition and was never defended by any of the English classical
economists. The evolutionists’ argument was ‘never antistate as
such, or anarchistic.’ It ‘accounted both for the proper functions
of the state and for the limits of state action’ (60; cf. 1973: 61–2;
1976: 54).
Limiting state coercion
Hayek acknowledges that his definition of freedom is incomplete
so long as coercion remains undefined. He thus examines various
ways of defining coercion, but the deeper question is why it is
desirable for the individual to have a sphere of freedom in which
coercion is reduced to a minimum.
Unlike romantics who imagine that society can flourish
without coercive government, Hayek insists that state coercion
is required to prevent private persons from coercing each other
(21). This does not mean that all private coercion can be eliminated.
Hayek grants, for example, that coercion of a subtle kind –
psychological pressures to give in to another’s moods or demands
– often occurs in private relationships that individuals enter into
voluntarily, but for the state to regulate or restrict such choices
would involve even greater coercion: ‘if people are to be free to
choose their associates and intimates, the coercion that arises
from voluntary association cannot be the concern of government’
(138).
The state monopolises coercion under all forms of government;
but in a free society, the exercise of government’s coercive
power is constrained and made predictable by general rules that
apply equally to all individuals, including those who make and
enforce the laws. Conformity to law is the primary safeguard
against arbitrary government – a point that Hayek will develop at
length in discussing the Rule of Law. We note that while the law is
constraining, it is not in itself coercive.
Coercion by the state is indispensable to freedom, but Hayek
wants to reduce the need for it to a minimum. This is possible only
where individuals can be expected to conform voluntarily to traditional
rules of conduct and, in particular, to common moral rules.
Evolved moral rules, as distinct from synthetically constructed
ones, should thus be regarded with reverence and held as a matter
of sincere belief. Hayek follows ‘all the great apostles of freedom
outside the rationalistic school’ in emphasising that ‘freedom has
never worked without deeply ingrained moral beliefs’ (62).
Is our conformity to moral rules truly voluntary, or is it
simply produced by a different kind of coercion or compulsion
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