Hayek's The Constitution of Liberty - Institute of Economic Affairs

h ay e k ’ s t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f l i b e r t y
e q ua l i t y, f r e e d o m a n d j u s t d i s t r i b u t i o n
The relevant fact about human beings is not equality but
difference: ‘It is of the essence of the demand for equality before
the law that people should be treated alike in spite of the fact that
they are different’ (86). By ‘difference,’ Hayek means primarily
the inequalities among people that arise from both ‘nature’ and
‘nurture.’ Nature does not make individuals equal, but it does
make them unequal in capacities, talents and such. As for nurture,
social life, especially the family, produces inequalities that give
some individuals an advantage over others.
We must pause to wonder whether Hayek’s case for freedom
doesn’t require a natural or inherent equality among individuals
and whether, in repudiating this idea, he jeopardises his own
position.
First, the very idea of ‘the individual’ – the human being shorn
of all qualities that make him different from others – is an egalitarian
concept, especially when it is interpreted to mean that each
individual should enjoy equal freedom in his own private sphere.
Second, Hayek builds his case for freedom on the principle that
each individual should be free to pursue his own aims or plan of
life. If another forces me to submit to his will, he is using me as a
means to his end and thus is violating my freedom: ‘Coercion is
evil precisely because it thus eliminates an individual as a thinking
and valuing person and makes him a bare tool in the achievement
of the ends of another’ (21).
This argument requires a moral imperative of the kind that
Kant articulated – namely, that human beings must always be
treated as an end and not merely as a means to someone else’s
purposes. At one point Hayek writes: ‘A society that does not
recognize that each individual has values of his own which he
is entitled to follow can have no respect for the dignity of the
individual and cannot really know freedom’ (79). Where does
this individual entitlement to one’s own values come from, and
why is it true that individuals as such have a ‘dignity’ that we must
respect? We are touching here on Hayek’s ultimate justification
for freedom. He is mostly silent on the matter, apparently because
of a reluctance to acknowledge that human beings are in some
fundamental ways inherently equal.
While some aspects of democratic society are disturbing to
Hayek, he speaks favourably of egalitarian manners: The ‘extension
of the principle of equality to the rules of moral and social
conduct is the chief expression of what is commonly called the
democratic spirit – and probably that aspect of it that does
most to make inoffensive the inequalities that liberty necessarily
produces’ (85). By the same token, Hayek opposes social arrangements
based on class privilege and extreme differences in wealth:
One may well feel attracted to a community in which there
are no extreme contrasts between rich and poor and may
welcome the fact that the general increase in wealth seems
gradually to reduce these differences. I fully share these
feelings and certainly regard the degree of social equality
that the United States has achieved as wholly admirable.
(87–8)
One might favour ‘more even or more just distribution’
while rejecting coercive means to bring this about. Indeed, social
equality can be a valid policy consideration: ‘Wherever there is
a legitimate need for government action and we have to choose
between different methods of satisfying such a need, those that
incidentally also reduce inequality may well be preferable.’ For
example, the law of intestate succession might be so framed as to
favour equality. Lest he be misunderstood, Hayek concludes these
78
79