Hayek's The Constitution of Liberty - Institute of Economic Affairs

h ay e k ’ s t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f l i b e r t y
t h e u s e a n d l i m i t s o f k n o w l e d g e
embodied in a society’s traditions and beliefs as well as in man’s
own unconscious habits. Within the totality of such rules or
values, Hayek distinguishes moral values from the rest. Moral
values are rules of social conduct; and Hayek insists that we have
‘no choice but to submit’ to such rules, even though we might
not know the rationale for them or see ‘that anything important
depends on their being observed in the particular instance.’ Moral
rules address us as unconditional demands and not as expedient
options: ‘At any one stage of our evolution, the system of values
into which we are born supplies the ends which our reason must
serve.’ Moral rules thus resemble Kant’s categorical imperative,
but of course they are products of social evolution and not formulations
of the rational will. Even Kantian ethics is derivative from a
prior tradition, i.e. it is an extension of ‘the basic idea underlying
the rule of law’ (62–6; 196–7).
Insofar as possible, Hayek wants to make tradition and moral
rules self-legitimising. The alternative – to have their legitimacy
dependent on something else – is both unattractive to him and
contrary to his understanding of moral experience. He could, for
example, argue that we ought to obey traditional rules because in
doing so we promote a larger end. This would, however, require
the everyday actor to think like a social theorist. As Hayek writes
later, ‘acting individuals usually do not understand’ the ‘functions’
of cultural rules that emerge spontaneously (1979: 155). A social
theorist such as Hayek does take an instrumentalist view, because
he sees that obedience to moral rules produces spontaneous order
and also determines whether an evolving society will survive and
prosper in the long run. The theorist recognises that ‘the ultimate
decision about what is good or bad will be made not by individual
human wisdom but by the decline of the groups that have adhered
to the “wrong” beliefs’ (35–6). Social actors, however, perceive
moral rules as ‘a value in itself ’ and do not require instrumentalist
or expedient reasons for obeying them.
Another way to legitimise traditional rules would be to seek
support from religion, but Hayek, as a scientist, had refused
throughout his career to take this path. He rejects all causal explanations
that appeal to invisible essences or hidden spiritual forces,
since these amount to superstition. Nevertheless, he concedes that
there are ‘good reasons why any person who wants to live and act
successfully in society must accept many common beliefs, though
the value of these reasons may have little to do with their demonstrative
truth.’ This requirement ‘applies to all our values,’ but ‘it
is most important in the case of moral rules of conduct’ (64–5).
In this guarded and even cryptic statement, Hayek is silent
as to whether these ‘common beliefs’ have a religious character
and whether they might serve to legitimise the moral rules to
which they are attached. Much later, in The Fatal Conceit, Hayek
addresses these issues directly. He wonders whether he has
underestimated the role of religious belief in sustaining beneficial
customs: ‘even an agnostic ought to concede that we owe our
morals, and the tradition that has provided not only our civilization
but our very lives, to the acceptance of’ claims that are scientifically
unacceptable, such as those advanced by religion’ (1988: 137).
In an appendix, he cites favourably Sir James Frazer’s argument
that superstition rendered humanity a great service by protecting
marriage and private property (ibid.: 157). Of course, traditional
rules cannot be self-legitimising if they must depend on the
authority of religion (or superstition) to uphold their authority.
Hayek seeks not only to describe the role that values play
in social life, but above all to justify a particular set of values, as
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