Hayek's The Constitution of Liberty - Institute of Economic Affairs

h ay e k ’ s t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f l i b e r t y
t h e u s e a n d l i m i t s o f k n o w l e d g e
picture of ultimate being. Hayek himself presents such a view
in The Sensory Order. The individual mind is here described as a
complex of relations in the central nervous system that classifies
sense perceptions according to some interpretive framework. This
means that sense data are never perceived by us in a raw or direct
form. What we perceive are things with distinct qualities; and
such perceptions have already been formed by the mind’s classificatory
and interpretive operations. The mind’s perceptions of
reality are necessarily interpretations in line with some classificatory
scheme (see 1952a; also Miller, 1972: 250–64).
Radical historicism, however, took a second and more farreaching
step. If the mind is essentially historical, this means
that the categories of thought also change, so that reality itself is
understood differently according to time and place. Moreover,
there is no final or privileged epoch of the kind Hegel posits, in
which reason reaches perfection by understanding the historical
process as a whole. Human thought necessarily understands
reality from some point of view. There are many such viewpoints,
and no particular one has a justifiable claim to finality.
In his writings from the 1940s and early 1950s, Hayek strongly
opposes the historicist claim that ‘the human mind is itself
variable’ and holds instead that ‘all mind must run in terms
of certain universal categories of thought’ (1952b [1979]: 133,
136). In The Constitution of Liberty, however, Hayek appears to
change course, declaring that man’s mind ‘is itself a system that
constantly changes as a result of his endeavor to adapt himself to
his surroundings’ (23). A few years later, he explains that ‘man’s
capacity to think is not a natural endowment of the individual but
a cultural heritage, something transmitted not biologically but
through example and teaching – mainly through, and implicit in,
the teaching of language.’ Much more than we are yet aware of,
language probably ‘determines our whole manner of thinking and
our view and interpretation of the world.’ Our language furnishes
us with a ‘picture of the world’ or framework of thought, which
presumably includes the mind’s basic concepts or categories
(1967: 86–7). Given the plurality of languages, there must be many
world pictures or frameworks for understanding reality; and
these must be changeable, since language is part of a culture, and
culture changes.
Hayek leaves very much in doubt the possibility that reason,
linked as it is to the evolution of mind and civilisation, can ever
achieve a view of reality that has a justifiable claim to finality. Such
a view would seem to be impossible from within the historical
process; and if history has no end, there would appear to be no
final or privileged standpoint that would permit reason to grasp
timeless principles. One must wonder, however, if such a teaching
can accommodate Hayek’s own ambitious programme, which
puts forward a synoptic view of mind, civilization, order and
liberty with a considerable degree of finality.
Values
The concept of ‘values’ is pivotal to Hayek’s overall account of
knowledge and to his defence of freedom. Later we will see that
Hayek’s ‘ideal’ embodies a very specific set of values. In this
section I want to make three points. First, Hayek rejected the
fact–value dichotomy, even when it was widely accepted by social
scientists. Second, Hayek understands values in terms of rules to
be followed rather than as particular ends to be pursued by the
rational will. Third, Hayek would become increasingly concerned
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