Hayek's The Constitution of Liberty - Institute of Economic Affairs

h ay e k ’ s t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f l i b e r t y
s a f e g ua r d i n g p r o g r e s s
Hayek urges ‘that there should be as many independent centers of
work as possible,’ providing capable and devoted researchers with
the freedom to reach and expound their own conclusions, regardless
of whether these conclusions ‘are palatable to their employer
or the public at large’ (389–90).
Academic freedom is granted to universities to protect them
against outside pressures to affirm the prevailing conventions
and values. While approving the doctrine of academic freedom,
Hayek warns that conformist pressures often come from within
the university. In particular, he opposes ‘the ideal of a unified and
centralized direction of scientific efforts,’ whether directed by
outside authorities or by some committee of distinguished scientists
(391). The planning of science must inevitably fail to reach
its objectives, because the outcome of scientific research is unpredictable.
It depends in large degree on accident and on unforeseeable
events. No one can say in advance what line of inquiry or
what particular researcher will be successful. Hayek expects that
individual scientists, making the best use of their opportunities,
will more likely succeed in making important discoveries than
research teams (392–93; cf. 388–94).
By contrast to elementary schools, research universities can
support only a few students at public expense. The community’s
interest here is not to help particular students, but to advance civilisation.
Even so, the recipients of aid have opportunities that are
not available to others; and as a result of their superior education,
they are likely to enjoy greater wealth and social esteem. Are these
state-fostered inequalities justifiable? Here, as in earlier chapters
of The Constitution of Liberty, Hayek opposes efforts to equalise
opportunities, arguing that the public’s interest is best served by
allowing individuals to make full use of the opportunities available
to them, even though these opportunities are limited to a few and
inequality is the inevitable outcome (382, 385–6).
Political philosophers traditionally have taught that each
political regime aims to produce the type of citizen that accords
with that regime; and Hayek agrees that this has been the case.
He insists, however, that moulding citizens of a particular type is
not the proper business of government. To do so is to presume
to know what type of human being the future will prefer; but we
cannot know how the future will assess man’s moral and aesthetic
qualities. The solution is to encourage a variety of types. Freedom
means that ‘no superior must be allowed to enforce one set of
views of what is right or good’ and that ‘only further experience
can decide what should prevail.’ Each generation must endeavour
to add its share ‘in the growth of knowledge and the gradual
advance of moral and aesthetic beliefs’ (394; cf. 380).
Hayek cautions against expecting too much from general
enlightenment. Rationalist liberalism set out to ‘conquer ignorance,’
but Hayek doubts that such a goal is feasible or that society
can be improved this way: ‘There is not much reason to believe
that, if at any one time the best knowledge which some possess
were made available to all, the result would be a much better
society’ (376–80).
Education, properly understood, views man as a being in
progress or as one who ‘reaches beyond his present self.’ Education
thus goes hand in hand with human freedom, whose ultimate
aim ‘is the enlargement of those capacities in which man surpasses
his ancestors.’ Freedom does have a purpose or aim, although its
consequences are unforeseeable. Hayek concludes in this vein by
quoting a well-known passage from Humboldt to the effect that
liberty’s overriding aim is ‘human development in its richest
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