Hayek's The Constitution of Liberty - Institute of Economic Affairs

h ay e k ’ s t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f l i b e r t y
i n d i v i d ua l f r e e d o m , c o e r c i o n a n d p r o g r e s s
subject to coercion by the arbitrary will of another or others’
(11). This definition goes back to the earliest distinction between
slaves and free men; and it has been affirmed by the best modern
proponents of liberty, who insist on a free private sphere, defined
by clear rules and protected from arbitrary coercion, in which the
individual may pursue his own aims, so long as his actions do not
violate the freedom of others. Hayek concedes that he is advancing
a ‘negative’ view of freedom (the absence of coercion), but he also
insists that such freedom takes on a ‘positive’ character through
the use that individuals make of it (19).
Third, a free society cannot exist without free individuals and,
as Hayek will go on to argue, this requires freedom for all. Some
collectivist teachings have posited a social or political freedom
that excludes individual freedom, but Hayek strongly rejects any
effort to divorce the two.
Hayek acknowledges that freedom has acquired meanings that
are quite different from the one he prefers. Individual freedom
should not be confused with ‘political freedom,’ understood as a
people’s consenting to a government, participating in legislation,
or controlling administration. Popular consent and participation
won’t necessarily secure individual freedom and may work against
it (13–15).
Again, individual freedom is not to be understood as exercising
free will or choosing one’s course of action and sticking
to it. In defining a condition of freedom, the question is whether
others can impose their will on me, not whether I can follow my
own will. Hayek recognises, however, that the problem of free will
is an important one; and he returns to it in Chapter 5, where he
discusses responsibility.
Hayek insists that liberty and responsibility cannot be
separated. Liberty requires that the individual ‘must bear the
consequences of his actions’ (71). Without responsibility in this
sense, individuals would be unable to learn from their experiences
and to enjoy personal growth. Moreover, a free society ‘will not
function or maintain itself unless its members regard it as right
that each individual occupy the position that results from his
action and accept it as due to his own action’ (71). Scientific determinism
teaches, however, that actions result not from one’s own
free choice, but from circumstances beyond one’s control; and
many believe that this scientific teaching has destroyed the basis
for individual responsibility.
Hayek does not reject determinism altogether. The conception
of responsibility ‘rests, in fact, on a determinist view’ – the view
that actions follow from such ‘internal’ causes as emotion and
habit (73). This raises the question of ‘inner freedom,’ or whether
internal causes deprive actions of their voluntary character. Hayek
does not pursue this question, since he is concerned with a determinist
teaching that looks to external rather than internal causes
of action. This form of determinism is an offshoot of nineteenthcentury
physics. It holds that our actions and mental operations
are necessarily determined by material circumstances ‘external’ to
the actor.
In refuting scientific determinism, Hayek does not try to show
that it is false, but only that it is wrong pragmatically. It conflicts
with what we believe to be the case when we urge people to observe
certain rules. Experience leads me to believe that my admonitions
will make a difference in a person’s conduct, and I want that
person to believe that he should choose the responsible path; but
the truth is that neither of us knows whether free choice is possible
or whether praise and blame can make a difference (72–6).
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