Hayek's The Constitution of Liberty - Institute of Economic Affairs

h ay e k ’ s t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f l i b e r t y
i n d i v i d ua l f r e e d o m , c o e r c i o n a n d p r o g r e s s
requires a justification that upholds freedom even if the individual
is unsuccessful in attaining his ends or, should he succeed, finds
their attainment unappealing. His solution is to emphasise the
value of striving and learning:
What matters is the successful striving for what at each
moment seems attainable. It is not the fruits of past
success but the living in and for the future in which
human intelligence proves itself. Progress is movement for
movement’s sake, for it is in the process of learning, and
in the effects of having learned something new, that man
enjoys the gift of his intelligence. (41)
This principle – that progress is continuous striving and
learning – applies both to the individual and to humanity at large.
Freedom and progress
Individuals cherish freedom of action and benefit personally
from it, but Hayek’s case for individual freedom rests on broader
considerations: ‘It is not because we like to be able to do particular
things, not because we regard any particular freedom as essential
to our happiness, that we have a claim to freedom’ (32). Hayek’s
broader argument for individual freedom comes to light particularly
in Chapters 2 and 3, where he emphasises its contribution to
society at large and to the progress of civilisation.
Hayek prepares the ground for this broader argument by
insisting that I may benefit much more from the way other individuals
use their freedom than from how I use my own. In fact,
the benefits which I derive from freedom are ‘largely the result of
the uses of freedom by others, and mostly of those uses of freedom
that I could never avail myself of ’ (32). The useful contributions of
even a few individuals can be of immense value to their contemporaries.
Indeed, the freedom ‘that will be used by only one man
in a million may be more important to society and more beneficial
to the majority than any freedom that we all use’ (31). This result
does not require disinterested or benevolent actions, although it
may proceed from such motives. Typically the actor, in seeking to
benefit himself, also benefits unknown persons without intending
to do so or foreseeing this result.
Hayek continues this argument by calling attention, as he
often does, to our fundamental ignorance. I can never know which
particular individuals will use their freedom so as to benefit me
and the rest of society. Certainly I cannot identify in advance
that ‘one man in a million’ whose contribution will be immense.
Hayek describes freedom as ‘opportunity for the unknown few’
(533). Only by extending freedom as broadly as possible can we
provide an opportunity for these unknown benefactors to use
their freedom effectively. Since no one has sufficient knowledge
to pick and choose such individuals, freedom must be given to all.
From here Hayek proceeds to show that individual freedom is
essential to the long-term growth of civilisation and the advance
of humanity at large. The progress of civilisation depends on
man’s freedom to experiment with new ways of doing things. Here
again, no one can predict in advance which ‘experiment in living’
will move civilisation ahead. Progress cannot be designed: ‘it is
not achieved by human reason striving by known means toward
a fixed aim.’ Progress ‘always leads into the unknown.’ At most
we can only expect ‘to gain an understanding of the kind of forces’
that bring about undesigned growth and try to create conditions
that are favourable to it (40).
Earlier we took note of Hayek’s insistence that a free society is
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